Japan s defence policy has been undergoing certain developments after the end of the Cold War. The unipolar system caused serious implications for alliances and especially for the unipole's allies. The two US-led Iraq wars made Japan adjust her policies for the US demands as of the hegemonic ally, despite her asymmetric alliance commitments. For the purpose of properly analysing Japan's decisions as a reaction to the demands of the US as the hegemonic ally, alliance security dilemma appears to be useful. Moreover, the correct analysis requires adjustment both for the unipolarity implications for the alliance behaviour and the peculiarities of the US-Japan alliance. The basic proposition of the alliance security dilemma assumes that in asymmetric alliances the weaker ally inevitably faces abandonment and entrapment risks, which makes it applicable for the US-Japan alliance case. The US demands of Japanese participation in Middle Eastern military operations made Japan face the dilemma: to give up and get engaged into an illegitimate war, which could provoke serious internal conflicts, or resist and potentially cause devaluation of Japan as an ally and denunciation of the security treaty. The both cases made Japan balance the risks of abandonment and entrapment, which could seriously damage the alliance sustainability if ignored. Despite differences in the US policies in the early 1990s and 2000s, in both cases the Japanese government had to cope with similar risks. The alliance security dilemma has an explaining potential for an allied state s foreign policy decisions analysis and presents a useful tool for the analysis of the US external pressure implications for Japan's defence choices.

Keywords: US-Japan alliance, unipolarity, alliance security dilemma, Iraq wars, defence, strategy.

Japan's defence policy after the WWII has been widely known as passive and US-originated. While, however, as deeper analysis shows, it is rather pragmatic and realistic in nature than passive, it is still an example of longing incrementalism. Moreover, it was much to the world community's surprise when Japan sent its navy to the Indian Ocean in order to support the US military operation in Afghanistan and the ground forces to Iraq later. Despite the limited character of that participation, it was the first time since the WWII for the Japanese troops to be sent abroad to support militarily an ongoing combat operation which was not even sanctioned by the UN. In contrast, it took very much pain to send a minesweeping crew to the Persian Gulf in 1991 even after all the hostilities were over. In both cases it was the US pressure which Japanese leaders had to respond to. The alliance security dilemma can help understanding why any responses took place at all.

It has become a matter of common consent by now that Japan's defence policy has been undergoing some developments since the end of the Cold War. Different assessments are

* The following paper is based on the research funded by the Japan Russia Youth Exchange Center.

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given to these changes within a wide range of approaches from incrementalism to radicalism. This is also true for the analysis of the factors which affect the process. While it is not broadly argued that the relations with the United States, especially in the security realm, do contribute to evolution of the situation, there is nothing like consensus on this contribution's scale. To start with, the international relations science has not come up with a sustainable theory on the alliance relations. While there have been attempts to reflect theoretically on the alliance formation processes, states behaviour within the alliances has not received sufficient theorizing yet. Moreover, for understandable reasons and recognizing the structural aspect's crucial role, theories have been focusing on multipolar and bipolar systems. Alliance politics under unipolarity condition remains understudied.

The forthcoming discussion is an attempt to answer the broad question of how the alliance factor affected Japan's defence policy evolution in 1991-2009 and the special one of whether the alliance security dilemma concept can explain Japan's defence choices or not. I will refer to the special concepts of alliance theory - Glenn Snyder's and Stephen Walt's ideas about alliance management and internal dynamics of alliances [Snyder, 1997; Walt, 2009]. They seem to have the most potential for explaining intra-alliance dynamics, and can be applied to the US-Japan alliance in particular. Thus, we can try to explain the cause-and-effect links between the alliance dynamics and Japan's defence policy.

In order to avoid forcing the issues, the basic assumption should be done for the purposes of the following discussion. Because the alliance security dilemma is considered unavoidable in asymmetric alliances, I will consider it applicable to the case of the US-Japan alliance, which is assessed to be highly asymmetric. In addition, while using the concept as an analytical framework, one should keep in mind the unipolar character of the world system and try to adapt the concept to this parameter. Having taken these moments into account, first I will shortly refer to the problem of the unipolarity implications for the alliance behaviour according to Walt's deliberations. Then, the main propositions of the alliance security dilemma will be described as they appear in Snyder's works. Finally, the combination of these theories will be applied to the case of the US-Japan alliance in order to define its impact on Japan's post-Cold War defence policy evolution.

UNIPOLARITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE BEHAVIOUR

The end of the Cold War was the structural shift that brought the unique moment of unipolarity. Such a system has never occurred before, which means specific implications for alliances in terms of both their formation and management. While an excellent analysis of structural impact on alliances can be found in Snyder's works, he describes multipolarity and bipolarity only. However, the unipolar system that witnesses concentration of power in the hands of the single state, or unipole, cannot avoid serious implications for alliances, both new and old.

Basic characteristics of a unipolar system let us deduce several main implications for the unipole and its real and potential allies. First, unipolarity means greater freedom of action for the unipole, that is no great rivals and less need for allied support. This means that the unipole has the capacity to act alone but does not entirely exclude the allies support: they might be needed, for example, to provide legitimacy for the unipole politics or to provide their facilities and bases. This leads to the next feature of unipolarity: states, and even unipole's allies, get concerned about power concentration, because the unipole's actions might affect the other states and the system. Despite the seriousness of concerns, balancing the unipole gets complicated, because in order to balance it effectively, states have to form and manage a large coalition of many members, which is not an easy task. Another concern for the weaker states is their ability to influence the unipole's choices. In a bipolar system, allied support is existential for the poles, so medium and small states can bargain with their patrons and benefit from trade-off. However, the unipole can do well without allies, thus making it difficult for these latter to find appropriate leverages to manipulate the unipole. All these conditions affect alliance politics under unipolarity.

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International relations theory has worked out several theories of alliance formation in multipolar and bipolar systems: balance-of-power [Waltz, 1979], balance-of-threat [Walt, 1985], balance-of-interest [Schweller, 1994], the autonomy-security trade-off model [Morrow, 1991]. These theories can be somewhat useful for the unipolar system analysis, but obviously in a limited scope. Principal choices for the weaker states in a unipolar system fall between extreme opposition to the unipole and formal alignment with it, with neutrality as the third option equidistant from the former two. Therefore, alliances in a unipolar world represent a form of reaction to the unipole domination. Stating this, Walt comes up with the range of concrete choices for the weaker slates, that is their potential alliance strategies: hard balancing (such an alliance is unlikely to form until the unipole poses an imminent threat); soft balancing (directed against specific policies of the unipole rather than the overall distribution of power); "leash-slipping" (alliances intended to enhance autonomy, that is to reduce dependence on the unipole by pooling own capabilities); bandwagoning (also unlikely to appear because requires the weaker state to tie to the stronger power with which they have significant conflicts of interest and which is probably directing latent or overt threats at them); regional balancing (close ties with the unipole when the threat to be countered is a neighbouring power or some other local problem) [Walt, 2009].

Of course, this is not a universal set of options, and states can show combined strategies with elements of many. As stipulated, unipolarity is a novel condition and we probably simply cannot grasp all its features yet.

Once the alliance is formed, the problem of its management arises. Under unipolarity, there is a greater potential for fluctuation in threat perceptions of regional allies and the hegemonic ally. These threat perceptions cannot be fully deduced from the system's structure; they are influenced more than they were in the bipolar system by geographic variations, different perceptions of intentions, various domestic factors, and ideology. Within an alliance, such fluctuations in threat perceptions pose a serious challenge to the allies, especially for the smaller allies in an asymmetric alliance. Thereafter, the unipole and its allies will act accordingly. Most likely, the unipole's partners will tempt to free-ride: to shift the burdens of providing security on to the unipole, while seeking to maximize their own influence within the alliance itself. In addition, small and medium powers will try to free-ride on the unipole whenever it is possible, while insisting on alliance norms that retain their voice in alliance decision-making. Thus, they are expected to favour highly institutionalized arrangements aimed at ensuring that the unipole (or other strong allies) do not simply impose their preferences on the weak. The unipole, by contrast, will try to use its unfettered position to play potential allies off against one another and instead of favouring highly institutionalized multilateral arrangements that can tame its power within a web of formal procedures, norms, and rules, the unipole will prefer to operate in ad hoc coalitions of the willing, even if forming each new arrangement involves somewhat greater transaction costs. In assembling these coalitions - which are needed less for the capabilities they produce than for the appearance of legitimacy they convey - the unipole naturally prefers to include states it believes will be especially loyal or compliant, so the stronger the unipole is relative to others, the more selective it can be and the greater the premium it can place on loyalty.

The level of strategic uncertainty gets increased for the allies, largely because allies' threat perceptions under unipolarity are more likely to diverge across time or issue areas and are not shaped as much by structural systemic factors. Although they want to maintain the pre-existing security arrangements as a means of managing the rising uncertainty, allies need to deal with the dual concern of either being trapped into the hegemonic partner's policies, or being abandoned by it. This deepens the alliance security dilemma.

THE ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA

According to Snyder, the alliance game may be conceived broadly as the management of the security-autonomy trade-off. The original alliance represents an optimum security-autonomy mix deriving from the members' respective bargaining power. With time, as changes

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happen in environment, interests, capabilities and even domestic situation, disruption of the initial optimum occurs. This exacerbates the alliance security dilemma, which is "the tension between the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment" [Snyder, 1997, p. 181]. Abandonment and entrapment are the extreme forms of alliance outcomes for all the partners, which mean that not only the weaker partner suffers these pressures. This point adapted to the unipolarity means that the weaker state has much more at stake than the stronger, because the unipole tends to avoid too tight linkages with allies.

Snyder in his analysis dissects the abandonment and entrapment risks in a multipolar world. The worry of being deserted by the ally is a pervasive aspect of alliances, because it has alternative partners and may opt for one of them. The cost of such a defection will be high despite the fact that in a multipolar system states depend on allies for their security. The risk of being abandoned in a unipolar world appears much stronger for the weaker state not only due to existence of a wide range of potential partners for the unipole, but also because the latter has the capacity to ignore its formal ties with the weaker partner. The maximum cost of abandonment is loss of security, which can be avoided by increasing one's commitments to the ally and thus reducing its temptation to defect. But, moving closer to the ally raises the risk of entrapment.

Entrapment suggests being dragged by one's commitment to a war over interests of the ally one does not share or share only partially. The extreme cost of entrapment is loss of autonomy, which can be avoided by moderating one's commitment to the ally or holding support in specific crises or disputes. But distancing from the ally strengthens risks devaluing the alliance and causing its destruction. Thus, the dilemma occurs: acting to reduce one of the worries tends to increase the other. Simply put, the more the commitments are, the higher is the probability of being entrapped. Conversely, the less the commitments are, the higher is the probability of being abandoned. The weaker state's choices appear to be the function of its assessment of these probabilities. In a unipolar system, the risk of being abandoned may be prevailing over the risk of being entrapped, because the unipole is probably the only security guarantor. Hence, following one's commitments to support the unipole to the extent of fighting a war, albeit unpopular with one's own people, may be the only option for the weaker state to provide its own security.

The alliance security dilemma is softened when allies have common threats by the unlikelihood of abandonment and low cost of entrapment, since a war precipitated by either ally would be fought in other's interest as well. When they face different enemies, the dilemma is deeper, since each is more likely to stand aside when the other is attacked, and the cost of being entrapped is higher because they do not share each other's interests.

One more observation within this concept is worth mentioning: decision makers are usually more aware of abandonment than entrapment risks [Snyder, 1997, p. 314]. This derives from the assumption that the risk of being abandoned is less easily reduced than the risk of being entrapped. Adaptation of its politics to the danger of entrapment costs less for a state than correlation of its course with the danger of abandonment, which means that a state will respond to the abandonment risk first. Seeking for a positive reputation of a committed ally can make a state demonstrate differing responses in somewhat similar situations (which Japan did during two Iraqi campaigns of the US).

The alliance security dilemma is inevitable in asymmetric alliances, so the concept in general is applicable to the US-Japan alliance case. However, the problem here is the limits to which it is applicable concerning US-Japan alliance specifications.

The state behaviour within the alliance varies between the two poles of cooperation and defection. Cooperation may be defined as a strong commitment to alliance obligations. It includes material and/or verbal support for the ally in contingencies against the adversary. Defection is a weak commitment to the alliance, including little support for the ally in con-

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flict with the adversary. The degree to which a state cooperates or defects depends on its assessment of its abandonment and entrapment concerns.

So, what do "abandonment" and "entrapment" mean in Japan's case?

Abandonment is the fear that the ally may leave the alliance or may not fulfil its obligations to it. In the extreme case, abandonment means dealignment or realignment, but it generally occurs when the ally "[m]ay fail to make good on his explicit commitments; or may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected. In both of the latter two variants, the alliance remains intact but the expectations of support which underlie it are weakened" [Snyder, 1984, p. 466]. It is highly unlikely that the US-Japan alliance can break up and the Security Treaty be terminated, due to high level of alliance equities [Calder, 2010]. Therefore, abandonment would probably mean not defection, but weakening of the US commitments and security obligations to the extent where Japan would have to bear full responsibility for its own defence, even including the nuclear option.

Conversely, entrapment generally occurs when a commitment to an alliance turns detrimental to one's interests. Therefore, entrapment would probably mean a situation when Japan is dragged into a conflict over the US interests to the extent that it seriously violates Japan's domestic restraints on defence issues. Both outcomes are highly undesirable and Japan's defence policy is designed to escape such anxieties and balance the abandonment and entrapment risks.

How a state can actually recognize if it is facing abandonment or entrapment risks? Abandonment and entrapment usually refer to actual military behaviour, but both problems can also take on political or economic forms. Thus, political statements downplaying or conditioning alliance commitments, political manoeuvring against one's common enemy, or implicit threats to sanction allies, for example, can be perceived as signs of abandonment. Even when military entrapment is not a major concern, there may still be a significant fear of political entrapment - that is fear of a decline in one's ability to make meaningful foreign policy decisions and to conduct meaningful foreign policy independently [Press-Barnathan, 2006]. Finally, it is also possible to talk about economic entrapment, in which a state finds itself financially supporting the political or military behaviour of its ally, which it may not approve. The dangers of military, political, and economic entrapment and abandonment may become intertwined.

Assuming the specifications, is it relevant to state that Japan was suffering a dilemma in the wake of the Persian Gulf War in early 1990s? The answer would be positive, because the end of the Cold War questioned the initial balance and purpose of the US-Japan alliance. The two US strategies for the Asian Pacific rim of the early 1990s [A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim..., 1990; A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim..., 1992] outlined restructuring and reduction of the US forces in the region (the process was halted, but the fact could not be ignored). The 1990-1991 Gulf crises revealed the sharpness of the problem of burden sharing and Japan's real commitments: domestic pressures could have led to US abandonment and American demands created risks of entrapment. Japan's failed response damaged its credibility in the eyes of many in the United States, especially members of Congress [The Tests of War..., 1998]. In 1993-1994, Washington and Tokyo once again failed to coordinate during the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, giving rise to uncertainty about Japan's rear-area role in the event of a security contingency.

Thus, in the early 1990s, the prospect of a breakdown of US-Japan ties seemed highly possible. Some Americans questioned the wisdom and cost of keeping the global network of alliances built during the Cold War intact. Many US experts and officials saw a need for Japan to do more to share the burdens of the alliance, expressing concerns that it was vague and out of date and therefore unsustainable for long-term perspective (at least, in its current form) [Hearings before the Subcommittees, 1995]. Voices advocating US withdrawal from the region became sound and spread [Gholz, 1997]. Many American elites supposed that the Cold War version of the US-Japan alliance could be one regional crisis away from its demise, which raised the question of its practical necessity.

Moreover, during President Bill Clinton's administration, Japan had serious reasons to be concerned of the alliance durability. The economic agenda of the new administration sup-

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posed a tough and confrontational approach to its trade problems with Japan while warming up toward Beijing. Once the Cold War ended, the terms of the grand bargain that underlay the alliance became outmoded [Pyle, 2007, p. 336, 349].

Such deliberations and the US tough trade policy could not be ignored in Japan. Japanese domestic support for the alliance showed signs of erosion, that Washington did not value the security relationship as before. Japanese commentary that Japan should turn more to Asia after decades of being dependent on the US began to appear with greater frequency and resonance [Mochizuki, 1997].

The Higuchi report (1994) to the Prime Minister of Japan, which attempted to frame defence policies in a new way, can be interpreted in the way that Japan was trying to gradually increase its autonomy [The Modality of the Security..., 1994]. It suggested moving from a "[C]old war defensive strategy" to a "multilateral security strategy". Although Japan's own defence capabilities and cooperation with the US would remain important pillars of Japanese security policy, the report emphasized greater participation of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces in the United Nations peacekeeping operations, more active government support for international arms control processes, and government promotion of regional security dialogues.

It may seem that such a reaction does not fit the assumption that when a state fears abandonment, it will probably choose to show a stronger commitment to the alliance. However, the Higuchi report was designed to enhance Japan's security stance and military capabilities, including its cooperation with the ally - something the US leadership had always been encouraging Japan to do.

The fear of abandonment was reduced during the alliance redefinition process of 1995-1997, but Japan had to acquire a new regional role according to the new Defence Guidelines [The Guidelines..., 1997].

The beginning of the twenty first century witnessed new global changes that brought new challenges for the allies. Post 9/11 US strategy had serious implications for its allies as partners of the unipole. The key to alliances became risk sharing. The US expectations of Japan in particular grew substantially. The US discontent with Japan's longing for "free-ride" shaped new calls for Japan to share the burdens of the alliance. Japan's failure to respond to the US expectations during the first Gulf War and the Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, which endangered the alliance, stimulated Japan's response to the abandonment risk which peaked once again. The Bush administration made clear that alliances were less important than coalitions of willing partners ready to join in meeting new dangers. The US needed its principal allies in Europe and Asia to mobilize their financial resources to provide stability of the new Afghan regime at least in mid-term perspective [Sushentsov, 2013, p. 27]. Not only did the United States want Japan's participation in the out-of-area campaigns, it wanted a much tighter, proactive cooperation and a realignment of US forces that would reintegrate Japan into a global strategy for the war on terrorism [Pyle, 2007, p. 341].

The American side articulated its demands, calling Japan to "show the flag" when the operation in Afghanistan started, and asking for Japanese "boots on the ground" when the invasion of Iraq began. On many occasions, Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage suggested a US desire for a Japanese constitutional amendment to make an unambiguous commitment to collective defence. For Japan, the alliance security dilemma appeared, probably, in its hardest form: if Japan chose to resist joining the US "coalitions of willing" in military operations abroad or, for example, to deny the US use of its bases, it would risk abandonment. The result would be dangerous for Japan and destabilize the region. If Japan joined the US and declared its security role to be global, it would risk becoming entangled in wars not of its own choosing. The early 2000s saw the beginning of the loss by the US of its position of the only universal and global great power [Batalov, 2012, p. 8]. Nevertheless, many Japanese were expressing concerns that a closer alliance relationship would draw them into supporting the US agenda that would deprive them from of their autonomous approach and complicate the independent pursuit of their own interests, particularly in Asia. One widely known Japanese politician stated:

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"There is the clear emergence of the United States' unilateralism as the sole superpower and the increasing domination and hegemony in its interaction with other countries. We are faced with a difficult challenge: to incorporate US unilateralism into broader trends of multilateralism and regionalism, and persuade it to act in harmony with them" [Morimoto, 2002, p. 29-30].

However, it seems that, when faced with a choice between following the US and running the risk of entrapment, or distancing and facing the risk of abandonment, Japanese leaders respond first to the threat of abandonment. Prime Minister Koizumi's dispatch of naval forces to the Indian Ocean and deployment of ground forces to Iraq was the response to the threat of abandonment. Nevertheless, at the same time many Japanese policymakers expressed concerns that Japan simply had no choice but to support the US operation in Iraq due to its dependence on the alliance [Ishibashi, 2012, p. 140-145]. This brings up the entrapment argument.

It seems extremely hard to discern whether a state acts out of the fear of entrapment by the senior ally or for other reasons, for example, domestic policy calculations or public opinion considerations. Obviously, external pressures explain political leaders' incentives to contribute, but internal constraints account better for their ability to contribute and the form contributions take. In case of Japan, however, it is reasonable to say that its self-restricting norms are used as a hedging mechanism against excessive US demands. Indeed, when Japan is expected to contribute militarily (despite whatever strong diplomatic support it may show), its peaceful norms allow it escape such activities. As a result, the Japanese Self-Dedence Forces have been participating in the US operations, but for "noncombat" roles (even in the UN operations Japanese troops are used in peacekeeping, and not peace-making or peace enforcement).

The alliance security dilemma proposes that when a state fears entrapment, it will show a weaker commitment to the ally. For Japan, however, this is not probably an option, because avoiding the abandonment risks is the prevailing task, and keeping Japan's commitments at the Cold War level proved impossible under the US pressure after its end. For these deliberations, some see increasing Japan's autonomy as the best option, which would allow Japan avoid politically unacceptable obligations within the alliance. Japan's defence policy key documents of the post-Cold War period refer to multilateralism, the UN activism, regionalism and alliance cooperation as main principles of Japan's policies. For example, according to the Araki report (2004), Japan should pursue self-help, alliance cooperation, and international citizenship, simultaneously. Such an approach is supposed to help Japan balance the entrapment risks [Japan's Vision..., 2004].

Different geopolitical goals and different resource endowments create a gap in threat perceptions even when interests are shared. Japan's position is often described as "tactics divergence but strategic convergence" with the US, and has been a mixture of cooperative and balancing behaviour, than one may call "soft internal balancing". Although the term "soft balancing" usually refers to a state strategy of balancing the hegemon without creating formal alliances, for the purpose of this discussion the term is used at the alliance level, rather than global, to emphasize tacit and limited character of Japan's balancing within the alliance. Soft balancing strategy allows Japan to try to pursue its own goals even against the US will, while avoiding a serious risk of abandonment (as in the Aza-degan oil field issue, Six-Party talks on the North Korea nuclear program or East Asian economic integration plans). Thus, sharing the alliance risks helps prevent abandonment, and hedging the risks helps avoiding entrapment. One of the recent trends of Japanese foreign policy which is continuously being extrapolated to her defence policy is the act of balancing "soft" and "hard" power [The US-Japan alliance..., 2010]. Developing "soft power" instruments helps form a foreign environment favourable for Japanese national interests' promotion. This, in turn, creates environments and opportunities for choosing to avoid use of force and therefore soften the alliance security dilemma in cases of interests' collision between Japan and the US.

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* * *

The alliance security dilemma, which explains state's behaviour as a response to the fears of abandonment and entrapment, seems to have some explanatory power for the US-Japan alliance case. Responding to these risks makes Japan change its defence policy. The first Iraq crisis proved that Japan was not ready to contribute troops. Nevertheless, without the US pressure as a hegemonic ally, there would have been no Japanese participation at all and no 1992 Peacekeeping Operations Law, which opened the Japanese Self-Defence Forces the way to go overseas. Moreover, there would have probably been no dispatches to the Indian Ocean and Iraq a decade later. In some ways paradoxically, strengthening commitments to the ally makes Japan increase its own capabilities, which, in turn, helps Japan enjoy more self-interested defence policy, because the "cost" of being an ally with the US is constantly rising. Still, Japan's security policy is shaped largely by domestic rather than international determinants, which the highly limited character of Japanese allied participation evidences for. The usage of the military force as a foreign policy instrument remains extremely unpopular with the Japanese people [Midford, 2011]. Hence, despite how much revisionist the Japanese policymakers' intentions may be, they cannot ignore the public's deep resentment of militarism.

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