Any analysis that claims to be objective is impossible without comparisons. Therefore, when discussing the lessons of the counter-terrorism operation, it is impossible to do without a retrospective of the first Chechen campaign. Today, Colonel Alexander Kerdan, a senior correspondent for the Orienteer magazine in the Ural Military District, and his colleague, Colonel Vasily Dolgov, will provide a unique historical overview. In December 1994, Vasily Vladimirovich, then the Chief of Staff of a regiment, was sent to Chechnya. Colonel Dolgov currently heads the military department at the Ural State University and shares his valuable combat experience with young people.

- Vasily Vladimirovich, your officer service was such that you did not serve in Afghanistan or any other hot spots. In fact, you were in war for the first time in Chechnya... What are the feelings of a person who has been consciously trained to fight professionally throughout his entire life? A person who finds himself in a real war with its brutal challenges.

- The main feeling was that there was a lot of work to be done. And the work of the regiment's headquarters is not easy under any circumstances... Believe me, there was no time for other feelings. The biggest concern was whether we were capable of fulfilling the combat mission that had been assigned to us in such a situation. I emphasize that it was not a fear, but rather a concern about not forgetting to do something. It should be noted that our staff was well-prepared. Back at the permanent deployment point, during the exercises (in early 1994) in Chebarkul, the regiment was deployed and performed combat shooting. The headquarters worked hard during the command-and-staff exercises. And I can assure you that the units were well-prepared. However, this assessment was made in a peaceful situation.

Naturally, at that time, the regiment was staffed by officers who had served in Afghanistan. However, these were no longer junior commanders, but officers who were directly involved in combat. The experience of our regiment commander, Colonel Sergei Bunin, a former "Afghan" soldier, proved invaluable. He truly taught us a lot. This was our state of mind before we were deployed to Chechnya. There, our emotions were replaced by a more professional approach. Let me give you an example. When we were on our way from Mozdok to Grozny, our information was so scarce that it couldn't really be called information... We had no idea what was waiting for us ahead.

"The intelligence service didn't work?"

"Not really. I think the information reached a certain level. After all, agent intelligence was conducted. But the data obtained only had very high headquarters. We were given very fragmentary information: for example, places of concentration of militants were indicated. But the militants were mobile enough. Let's say that on the night before leaving Mozdok on December 29, 1994, we received some information about them, but by the morning of December 30, the data was actually completely different. This is one of the lessons of the Chechen War: information about the enemy must be up-to-date and accurate. A commander can only make decisions based on reliable information. You might say that regimental intelligence is designed for this purpose. However, experience has shown that regimental intelligence has "short arms," figuratively speaking, as it cannot operate beyond a distance of 50 to 100 kilometers. Yet, information from that distance is crucial. Consequently, troops must be fed by higher headquarters, which have a wider range of intelligence tools at their disposal. The second conclusion is that troops must be given more precise combat missions based on the actual situation. The task we received in Mozdok was completely different from the task we were given when we reached the Terek Range...

- What conclusions did you draw for yourself after your regiment had to participate in battles in the city?

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- The training for modern combat in a city should be completely different and based on different combat manuals. Today, we are learning to fight according to the manuals based on the experience of the Great Patriotic War. There are some modern elements in them, but overall, they are outdated for modern combat. Today, practice shows that there will no longer be a war like the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, the content of combat manuals should be updated more quickly. Let's take the example of a checkpoint. It's essentially a simple outpost. However, if you look closely, you'll notice that not only has its name changed, but so has the combat tactics of the soldiers stationed there. In the past, it was clear: we were here, and the enemy was there. Shoot, and there was no need for thought. However, now there is a factor of civilians, even if they sympathize with the militants, but they are still civilians. The decision-making officer cannot ignore this factor. After all, they bear moral responsibility for their team. It's scary to kill a person, even if they're an enemy. And if they're hiding behind women and children... That's why our soldiers often felt numb. It happened...

- Are you saying that the troops were not morally and psychologically prepared?

- It was carried out, but without taking into account the nuances, if I may say so. We usually prepare soldiers to destroy an abstract enemy. But in war, they face a specific person and must make a choice: to decide who to kill... This brings to the fore the moral factor and the question of the justice of war.

- What was new in the tactics of combat in Chechnya?

- In fact, studying and implementing best practices is one of the headquarters' tasks. We have been actively engaged in this. The first experience we gained was the ability to conduct combat operations at night. In a city, it is easier to storm a building at night, as there are fewer casualties. During the day, it is more convenient to defend the building. However, at first glance, it seemed otherwise. The structure of our units has also undergone changes. We have noticed that it is more effective to operate in the city with assault teams. Let's say we send a battalion or a company to carry out a combat mission, but in reality, it turns out that the assault teams created on the spot from the regular unit, 2-3 per company, carry it out. One of these teams was led by the company commander himself, the second deputy commander for educational work, or one of the platoon commanders.

- Were there any forms of fire support for these units?

- Even in combat conditions, we conducted special training sessions with our officers on artillery fire adjustment. It's true that motorized riflemen always rely on artillery, but they don't know how to manage it. Each battalion commander, company commander, and battalion staff officers were trained in artillery fire adjustment. As a result, everyone was able to direct the artillery to the target and provide the necessary coordinates to ensure that they completed their mission in their interests.

- Have you had to adjust your tactical standards: the immediate task, the next one?

- Of course. We can't forget that the battalions entered Chechnya with the same composition, but after just half a month of fighting, they were completely different. We only received reserves on January 15, 1995, which accounted for approximately one-third of our total casualties. This meant that we continued to carry out our combat missions with a reduced regiment. Additionally, the daily tasks were significantly different from the classic scenario. In the city, we did not carry out the daily tasks assigned to a regiment. At best, a regiment or battalion could advance 2 to 3 buildings per day, sometimes 5 to 6. However, there were cases when they couldn't capture more than one building in three days.

- What was missing in terms of weapons?

- We asked for the delivery of under-barrel grenade launchers. In the city, they are an indispensable weapon that multiplies the firepower of the motorized rifleman. After all, an infantryman usually carries 3-4 grenades, which they can throw at a distance of 60 meters if they are good athletes. However, with an under-barrel grenade launcher, a soldier can shoot accurately at a distance of 300 meters and carry a 12-grenade ammunition pack. This makes them much more powerful. The experience of urban warfare shows that grenades are essential in the city. I saw the door - first

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throw a grenade, then come in. This has been known since 1941. And then there's the battalion artillery. We had grenade launchers. They were very convenient. But after six months of combat, they broke down. There was no replacement. Once, when our regiment came under fire from militants, we had to "borrow" a mortar battery from a neighboring regiment...

- You are a tanker. Does a tank make sense in the city?

- The tank is a good armored vehicle with sufficient firepower to carry out its combat missions. However, the tactics of warfare have changed. We used tanks in the city, employing a tactic known as "the helicopter" - two tanks fire, supporting the assault team, while two tanks move in to replace them, and two more tanks load ammunition. This allows for continuous firepower against the enemy.

- Why did the militants burn so many armored vehicles?

- The infantry did not always cover the tanks well. And this is also a lesson. Without infantry, tanks are nothing. They can reliably stand on the defensive. But they must also cover up there. As for Chechnya, tanks were mostly destroyed in close combat by rocket-propelled grenades, not PTSD. There were cases when they were blown up by land mines. Accidentally ran over. The charges were so powerful that we couldn't even find the remains of the crew members. By the way, here's another lesson we learned from the war. We were completely unprepared for the task of identifying the bodies of the deceased. We decided that every incoming soldier should be issued an officer's badge. We asked the soldiers to describe their distinctive features, such as birthmarks, dental fillings, and tattoos. This information was stored in a special envelope and included in the soldier's personal file. This practice proved to be essential in the war. After all, when a general abolished body tags during the Great Patriotic War, soldiers began to write down their data and store it in cartridge cases in their tunic pockets. This is because death is red in the world. The most terrifying thing for a soldier is to disappear without a trace...

- Thank you, Vasily Vladimirovich, for a sincere and informative conversation. We wish you and your colleagues all the best.

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