Moscow, Mysl Publishing House. 1970. 444 p. Circulation 8000. Price 1 rub. 65 kopecks.
The problem of Russian absolutism, its character and peculiarities have been in the focus of attention of the scientific community in recent years. The discussion going on in various journals raised a number of important questions: the formation of bourgeois legal institutions, the relationship between feudal and bourgeois in the nature and politics of absolute monarchy, the role of the state, the evolution of the state apparatus, and others. A fruitful solution to these problems requires not only general theoretical, but also concrete historical research on the history of Russian absolutism and its polytheism.-
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tics at different stages of development. Therefore, the appearance of the book by Professor P. A. Zayonchkovsky of Moscow University is quite legitimate.
The 80s-early 90s of the XIX century are a peculiar period in the history of Russian absolutism, which has not yet been sufficiently studied. In the historical literature, it is characterized as a regression, as a "backward movement" from the half-hearted and limited bourgeois transformations of the 60s to counter-reforms and feudal reaction. But this happened at the stage of social development when the autocracy had already begun its evolution towards a bourgeois monarchy, during the period of growth and development of capitalism. The researcher is faced with the question of the significance of the political reaction and counter-reforms of the 80s and early 90s in the evolution of the absolute monarchy of the post-reform period and its politics, the historical conditionality and consequences of this "step back", as V. I. Lenin called it. The new work of P. A. Zayonchkovsky is of great interest for understanding these issues. It is a direct continuation of a number of previous studies of the author (on the abolition of serfdom, military reforms of the 60s - 70s, the crisis of the autocracy at the turn of the 70s-80s), devoted to one big topic - the internal policy of the autocracy in the post-reform period.
The reviewed monograph for the first time recreates the general picture of the political reaction of the 80s-early 90s. The main research issues, as defined by the author himself , are the analysis of the activities of higher state institutions, as well as the local government apparatus, government policy in the field of justice, education, censorship, preparation and adoption of counter-reforms. On all these issues, the book contains rich material, mostly introduced for the first time into scientific circulation. The author has studied especially carefully the funds of the Committee of Ministers, the State Council, the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Justice, Public Education, and numerous personal funds of state figures. This made it possible to show the concrete history of the preparation of all the measures that characterize the government reaction, the struggle of groups at the "top", the backstage springs of the actions of the government apparatus, to characterize the leaders of the reaction, Alexander III himself and the persons of the imperial family. In the general definition of the political reaction of P. A. Zayonchkovsky focuses on two typical features: the preservation and support of feudal-serf remnants and the growth of administrative arbitrariness in all parts of the government system (p.172).
The assessment of the legislation of the 80s and early 90s as a policy aimed at revising bourgeois reforms, preserving feudal-serf remnants and privileges of the nobility in the legal system of the country, has long been established in the literature. P. A. Zayonchkovsky analyzed the whole set of legislative measures of the government in the field of censorship, education, judicial system and judicial proceedings, zemstvo and urban self-government, social policy of the autocracy. The other side of government reaction - the growth of administrative arbitrariness-is revealed in a new way in the book. The author traced the confusion of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the activities of higher and local government bodies, the strengthening of the role of the Committee of Ministers at the expense of the State Council and the Senate; direct lawlessness and violation of existing legislative norms in the decisions of the Committee of Ministers, in the actions of ministers and especially governors, some of which (A. K. Anastasiev, P. V. Neklyudov, V. V. Val, N. M. Baranov, and N. M. Klingenberg) became notorious throughout Russia for its absurd and arbitrary orders. The book showed that from the zemstvo chief to the autocrat, the entire mechanism of state power, not controlled by public institutions and public opinion, was gradually permeated by the element of administrative arbitrariness, lawless and legalized. The author notes in the manifestations of state power those features that will fully develop already during the crisis of autocracy, at the beginning of the XX century: the decline in the moral level of the government, the spread of official lies as a system of government actions, the emergence of security departments and the development of agent activities, the appearance of saints in the church arena and the This is typical of the reign of Nicholas II.
The book presents data on the social situation of the Russian bureaucracy in the post-reform period based on the analysis of the "List of civil ranks of the first three classes"
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for the years 1854 and 1888. The most valuable statistical source - "Lists", published annually, still did not attract the attention of researchers. The author convincingly proves the decrease in the number of land owners among the bureaucracy (pp. 112-117). I think that it is interesting to supplement this conclusion with another characteristic feature of the post-reform Russian bureaucracy, which has already been noted in our literature [1 ]: the strengthening of material ties between the higher bureaucracy and big capital. The widespread "part-time work" meant the direct participation of the bureaucracy in the founding and management of banks and enterprises. However, in 1885 "part-time work" was banned by the tsar's personal order, and this was a victory for the local nobility, who during the years of reaction tried to turn the state apparatus entirely to serve their own interests. However, this ban did not change much, since various forms of communication between high officials and large enterprises and banks (government orders, the concession system, the establishment of joint-stock companies) multiplied, and" part-time work " was allowed each time by special high resolutions. These were the new features that testified to the adaptation of the State apparatus to the development of capitalist relations.
In order to characterize the autocracy and its policy at the end of the nineteenth century, it would obviously be necessary to focus more on those facts in which, despite the reactionary nature of the political course, the government still showed sufficient stability and viability. With all the archaic structure of state power, with all the frenzied reactionary government of Alexander III was the government of the country in which capitalism developed, and it to some extent contributed to this development.
The bizarre combination of feudal and bourgeois features in the autocratic monarchy and its policies was outwardly embodied in the personal composition of the government. The book gives vivid and memorable characteristics of the monarch, grand dukes with clearly emerging features of degeneration, ideological inspirers and practical leaders of the reaction-M. N. Katkov, V. P. Meshchersky, K. P. Pobedonostsev, D. A. Tolstoy. All these figures, despite some internal disagreements between them, were advocates of regression or at best stagnation, they did everything to "freeze" Russia. But the stability of the government of Alexander III is difficult to understand without balancing all this group of retrogrades with two most colorful figures as Finance Minister - I. A. Vyshnegradsky and S. Y. Witte, who succeeded him in 1892. Therefore, it is hardly legitimate that the author does not speak about these individuals, describing Alexander III and his "entourage". However, he writes about them below when considering economic policy. However, this placement of material interferes with a holistic impression of the government of those years. Vyshnegradsky and Witte were not as close to the tsar as Pobedonostsev (although Witte enjoyed his great sympathy), but in their influence and significance they are among the first figures of Alexander III's "entourage". In their person, new elements are making their way among the highest Russian bureaucracy, directly connected with the bourgeoisie, with the business world, and with the stock exchange. Of all the tsarist finance ministers, Vyshnegradsky was the first to be personally close to the big bourgeoisie. Witte was considered an unusual figure by experts in the high-ranking bureaucracy of St. Petersburg.2 Under the autocratic regime, where the Olympic isolation of the official world was the very essence of statehood, he introduced bourgeois methods into the practice of state administration in Russia.
But the point, of course, is not so much in the personalities of the finance ministers, but in the economic program that they implemented. Although this is a special area of domestic politics, the book devoted to political reaction gives an outline of the economic measures of the autocracy, which seems quite natural. Perhaps even this question deserved more attention to the extent that economic policy helps to understand the significance of the political reaction of the 80s and early 90s, the nature of autocracy, and the prospect of historical development (and this is largely due to the fact that economic policy is an important tool for understanding the political reaction of the 1980s and early 1990s).-
1 I. F. Gindin. State Bank and Economic Policy of the Tsarist Government, Moscow, 1960, p. 69.
2 E. M. Feoktistov. Diary. IRLI, Feoktistov Foundation, notebook III, sheet 49; V. P. Meshchersky. Memories. Volume III. SPB. 1912, p. 361.
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this is where the author concludes his research). P. A. Zayonchkovsky shows that the economic program as a whole was aimed at the development of industrial capitalism, that the turn of the government's internal policy from limited bourgeois reforms to counter-reforms did not have a significant impact on economic policy, and it continued the line of previous years in succession. While fully sharing this view, we believe that some influence of political reaction on economic policy should also be noted. The author himself casually remarks: "It would be wrong to imagine that the general nature of government policy had no impact on the scope of economic policy" (p. 139). However, this thesis is not disclosed in the paper. The author notes the reactionary features of agrarian legislation: the" strengthening " of the community, the restriction of the migration movement, the artificial preservation of the patriarchal foundations of peasant life, a sharp increase in direct state support for landowners-nobles, and the establishment of a Noble Bank on preferential, almost charitable terms. All these measures were in unison with the course of political reaction. But the impact of this course, I think, extended more widely - and in the sphere of financial and industrial policy. The" backward " step of the monarchy from bourgeois norms of social and political life to despotism, preserving the patriarchal immobility of the peasantry, without changing the bourgeois direction of economic policy, to a certain extent affected its methods. State intervention in the economy, which also took place in the 60s and 70s, has been particularly intensified since the mid - 80s under Vyshnegradsky and Witt, and it is no coincidence that it coincides with the course of political reaction. In the conditions of the rejection of the elementary norms of bourgeois law and order, the increased guardianship of the state over society and the individual, and the preservation of feudal-serf remnants in the agrarian system, general measures of economic policy and even the highest customs protection (the tariff of 1891) were insufficient. There was a need for multilateral state intervention in the economy in order to accelerate capitalist development. Increased state intervention in the economy during the pre-monopoly stage of capitalism is a characteristic feature of the Russian autocracy at the end of the 19th century.
Direct state intervention, as well as economic policy in general, which in some respects accelerated the country's capitalist development, combined with the most reactionary domestic political course inevitably increased the contradictions in the country and led in the long run to an acute general political crisis. In the article "The Reign of Alexander III", written in 1894, shortly after the emperor's death, G. V. Plekhanov prophetically said: "For 13 years Alexander III sowed the wind. Nicholas II will have to prevent the storm from breaking out. " 3 P. A. Zayonchkovsky concludes his research by saying that "the political reaction of the 80s and early 90s was one of the reasons that caused the revolutionary events of 1905-1907" (p.436). This is proven by the entire content of the book.
3 G. V. Plekhanov. Collected Works, vol. XXIV, Moscow, 1927, p. 168.
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