On the evening of June 25, 1945, a reception was held in the Kremlin for the participants of the Victory Parade. In his health resort, Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky, who commanded the parade, could not (and this is so understandable!) do without an elevated style: "I took command of the Victory Parade as the highest award for my many years of service in the Armed Forces."

But what a thorny path it was to this award... In May 1936, Rokossovsky, an active participant in the Civil War, who had been awarded the Order of the Red Banner three times for his military achievements on the front lines, and the Order of Lenin for his subordinates' outstanding performance in combat training, became the commander of the 5th Cavalry Corps. His service was successful, but in August 1937, he was arrested. Konstantin Rokossovsky was accused of being involved in a mythical "military-fascist conspiracy" within the Red Army.

Rokossovsky had a hard time. "They beat me... Two of them, three of them, they couldn't handle me alone! I held on, knowing that if I signed, it would be my death," the Marshal himself said at a meeting with students at the Frunze Military Academy in 1962. During the torture, he lost nine teeth, had three ribs broken, and had his toes smashed with a hammer. According to some reports, the prison guards staged a mock execution twice in order to break his spirit. It takes a strong will to remain strong after such an experience. In March 1940, the case was closed...

Major General Rokossovsky began the Great Patriotic War as commander of the 9th Mechanized Corps, which was part of the Kiev Special Military District. By the beginning of the war, the corps was almost fully staffed, but it only had a third of the required number of combat vehicles (old T-26, BT-5, and BT-7 tanks). Unlike many senior commanders who were lost in the confusion of the beginning of the war, the former prisoner showed decisiveness and the ability to firmly control his small forces from the very first minutes. At around 4 a.m. on June 22, 1941, he received a telephone message from the headquarters of the 5th Army instructing him to open a special secret operational package. This could only be done on the orders of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR or the People's Commissar of Defense, but the corps commander, realizing that communication with Moscow and Kiev had been disrupted, took the responsibility upon himself.

The package contained a directive to immediately put the corps on alert and move in the direction of Rovno, Lutsk, and Kovel. The necessary preparations were carried out quickly, but there were difficulties with obtaining vehicles, fuel, and ammunition. The corps commander ordered the nearby ammunition depots and vehicle park to be opened. Although this was beyond his authority, given that the depots were under central control, there was no time to wait for permission. Instead, the resistance of the quartermasters was broken down through the use of threats and promises. However, the corps was indeed able to maneuver quickly, and after traveling more than 100 kilometers, it concentrated north-west of Rovno.

The future Marshal I. Kh. Bagramyan, who was then the head of the operational department of the South-Western Front headquarters, recalled how timely and correct Rokossovsky's actions were:

"... The 87th and 124th Rifle Divisions, which were surrounded by the enemy near Lutsk, were waiting for help. And just as we at the front headquarters were trying to figure out how to rescue the Lutsk group, the main forces of the 131st Motorized Division and the advance detachments of the tank divisions of the 9th Mechanized Corps, commanded by K. K. Rokossovsky, arrived. When we read his report about this, we literally could not believe our eyes. How did Konstantin Konstantinovich manage to do this? After all, his so-called motorized division could only follow... on foot... The approach of his units to the Lutsk region saved the situation. They stopped the enemy tanks that had broken through and provided significant assistance to the retreating units in difficult conditions.

... Rokossovsky was born to be a professional soldier. His courage, determination, and strong will contributed to his rapid rise as a military commander in the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and the Kursk Bulge. He was entrusted with

page 22

He was entrusted with the most important tasks. For example, during the Battle of Stalingrad, his Don Front was tasked with destroying the encircled 330,000-strong enemy force. Additionally, during the preparations for the Battle of Kursk, he proposed the idea of establishing a strong defensive line in the Kursk salient, as he believed that the enemy would attempt to regain the initiative lost at Stalingrad. This idea resonated with the suggestions of General Zhukov, the representative of the High Command, leading to the decision to shift to a defensive posture in the Kursk region.

Many people argue, not without reason, that even Stalin, who was not at all inclined to sentiment, was subdued by Rokossovsky's inner harmony and spiritual qualities. According to some memoirs, the leader even called Rokossovsky "my Bagration". It would, however, be a great mistake to think that all this gave grounds for any indulgences. When, in May 1944, Rokossovsky began to develop a plan for the liberation of the southern part of Belarus, with a subsequent advance into the eastern regions of Poland (as part of the upcoming Belarusian Strategic Operation in the summer), he came up with a very unconventional idea. A thorough study of the terrain, which was wooded and marshy, and the enemy's defensive capabilities convinced him that, contrary to the principles of military strategy, it was necessary to launch not one but two equally powerful attacks: one from the area of Rogachev towards Bobruisk and Osipovichi, and the other from the lower reaches of the Berezina River towards Slutsk.

Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky supported Rokossovsky's proposal. However, the next day, on May 23, at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin's mood became tense. The Supreme Commander insisted on a single offensive. "Twice, I was asked to leave the room to consider the Stavka's proposal," the Marshal recalled. "After each 'consideration,' I had to defend my decision with renewed vigor." After making sure that I was firmly committed to our point of view, Stalin approved the operation plan as we had presented it.

The offensive launched by Rokossovsky's troops on June 24 was a success. In just five days of fighting, they broke through the enemy's defenses on a two-hundred-kilometer front, encircled and destroyed the Bobruisk enemy group, and advanced more than a hundred kilometers in depth. The offensive's pace was 22 kilometers per day! Konstantin Rokossovsky's tenacity in the face of the Supreme Commander's authority paid off. His efforts were recognized with the promotion to Marshal of the Soviet Union on June 29, 1944.

One of the most difficult episodes in the Marshal's life was related to the combat operations of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Warsaw direction. After Belarus, Poland lay before Rokossovsky's troops. And this was his native land.

All the encyclopedias stated that he was Russian and that he was born in Velikiye Luki. However, the personal record in the investigation file revealed the true information: he was born in Warsaw and was of Polish nationality. Could he, once a humble young man from Warsaw, have imagined that he would return here thirty years later at the head of an entire front to lead the sacred cause of liberating his homeland from the Nazi yoke?

In September 1944, after 40 days of intense fighting and crossing several rivers, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Vistula River. Moreover, they captured three bridgeheads on the western bank and took Praga, a suburb of Warsaw, on the right bank. An uprising was brewing in the Polish capital. However, our troops stopped. Why? This issue still concerns both front-line soldiers and military historians, and it has become an open wound in our relations with Poland.

Rokossovsky himself, speaking to the students of the Frunze Military Academy, answered the question as follows: "Warsaw is my hometown... I looked through my binoculars at the city of my youth, where my only relative, my sister, was still living. But all I could see were ruins. The troops were exhausted and had suffered significant losses. We needed to replenish our forces, bring in more ammunition, and create reserves. Without these measures, any attempt to cross the Vistula would be impossible. But we helped the rebels as much as we could: we dropped food, medicine, and ammunition from our planes, which we needed ourselves... We also landed a large force across the Vistula, but it was unsuccessful and retreated to the eastern bank after suffering significant losses...

All of this happened in front of Rokossovsky's eyes, and it undoubtedly left scars on his heart. He was unable to redeem himself when his plan for an offensive operation to liberate Warsaw was finally approved by the High Command. Once again, as was often the case in Konstantin Rokossovsky's life, politics intervened. On October 12, 1944, by the decision of the Stavka, Rokossovsky handed over the 1st Belorussian Front, which was operating on the main Warsaw-Berlin front, to Zhukov. Of course, he was offended, not only by the leader, but also by his longtime colleague. According to Georgy Konstantinovich's own admission, their relationship was no longer as friendly and cordial as it had been before.

However, the troops of the front, which were now under the command of Rokossovsky, were also tasked with an equally important mission: the elimination of the enemy's East Prussian forces. The offensive in East Prussia was organized in just a few days, and by January 20, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front had successfully breached the heavily fortified German lines. The Marshal led the 5th Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough, and its main forces reached the Baltic Sea coast on January 26, cutting off the enemy's retreat from East Prussia to the west.

At the same time, the front's left-flank armies crossed the Vistula in its lower reaches and entered East Pomerania. The rapidity with which Rokossovsky's troops acted cannot be overestimated. By confronting the German-Fascist Army Group "Vistula" in this area, which consisted of more than thirty divisions, including eight tank divisions, the units of the 2nd Belorussian Front thwarted the enemy's treacherous plan. The Germans intended to strike at the flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, whose troops had reached the Oder River. With his mobile units, the Marshal divided the enemy's forces into separate groups and destroyed them. The largest ports and naval bases on the Baltic Sea, such as Gdynia and Gdańsk (Danzig), were liberated.

On March 31, 1945, Marshal Rokossovsky was awarded the Order of Victory for his skillful leadership of major operations that resulted in outstanding achievements in defeating the German fascist forces.

And in June, there was the Victory Parade, which Stalin entrusted to Konstantin Konstantinovich...

page 23

Permanent link to this publication: