In the fundamental work " Russia and its Asian partners in a globalizing world. Strategic cooperation: problems and prospects " * Academician M. L. Titarenko notes that many Chinese historians and political scientists still regard the Russian-Chinese treaties of the past as unequal; among many Chinese researchers, the point of view about the alleged "seizure of a significant part of Chinese territory by tsarist Russia"is still being discussed. In this regard, he emphasizes: "We need to look for something in common that can become the basis for a constructive dialogue between cultures, first of all, for the interaction of Russian and Chinese cultures. We have no reason to idealize the situation and turn a blind eye to existing problems. We must see them, treat them carefully, and seek out, develop, and make recommendations on ways to establish a dialogue with our Chinese friends, partners,and neighbors. " ¹

It seems that an integral part of being balanced is the possession of historical facts, especially, in the language of English-language literature, "hard facts". After all, the history of Russian-Chinese cooperation and relations between both countries and their other neighbors does not lend itself to unambiguous black-and-white assessments. An objective approach to the past from a modern perspective is particularly harmful**.

A vivid example of the complexity and ambiguity of historical intricacies is the fate of Barga (Hulunbuir), now part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, a Chinese province with which the Russian Trans-Baikal Territory directly borders. This is discussed in the article by A. P. Tarasov.

A. P. TARASOV

Head of the Information and Analytical Department of the Legislative Assembly of the Trans-Baikal Territory (Chita)

Barga (Hulunbuir) Keywords: Inner Mongolia, history of Russian-Chinese relations

Soviet researcher V. A. Anuchin wrote about Barga, which has become a backwater corner of present-day China: "Barga for the rest of Manchuria is a distant "Zahinganye", sharply different both in nature and in economic activity of the population from all other regions of the country. Occupying an area lying south-east of the middle and lower reaches of the Argun River, bounded on the east by the Big Khingan ridges, the Barga is the north-western corner of Manchuria, which has always been more closely connected with neighboring Mongolia and Transbaikalia than with China"². For some time, when the Tunguska Prince Gantimur (who owned Barga in the middle of the XVII century) accepted Russian citizenship, almost all of Barga was part of the Moscow state. It is known that on the maps of the XVII century Barga was shown as part of Russia. The border with China was drawn on them along the main ridge of the Greater Khingan.

Since 1689, according to the terms of the Nerchinsk Peace Treaty concluded between Russia and China, Barga became a Chinese possession for the first time. But at the same time, the power of the Chinese government did not enjoy authority here. The local population almost always had very broad autonomy. China is too far away, and the Mongol population of Barga has always been distinguished by belligerence and love of independence.³

100 years ago, after the Xinhai Revolution overthrew the imperial regime in China, Barga declared independence in 1912. This and the subsequent events were closely intertwined with the history of the Russian Trans-Baikal Territory.

In 1668, after conquering China, the Manchus, by a special decree of the Obo government, declared their" sacred homeland " and the rear position of Manchuria a forbidden zone, closed to Chinese settlers. ⁴ At the same time, they considered the Mongols as their allies in the war with China, designed to become the second people of the empire after them, standing above the Han people. ⁵ While from the XVII-XIX centuries. ancestral lands

* For more information, see: Chudodeev Yu. V. Russia and its Asian partners in the globalizing world. Strategicheskoe sotrudnichestvo: problemy i perspektivy [Strategic Cooperation: Problems and Prospects].

** For more information, see: Origins of the Foreign Policy Tradition. Galenovich Yu. M. Kitay [China]. How the "traditional Political Culture" of Russia is interpreted / / Asia and Africa Today, 2009, N 11; Rusakov EM. Beyond time and space // Chudodeev Yu. V. China rethinks its history // Asia and Africa Today, 2010, No. 7 (ed. ed.).

The Manchus were settled and developed by Chinese farmers, Barga (Hulunbuir) as a Mongol territory, the Qins enjoyed protection from sinization (okitaevaniya).

However, at the beginning of the 20th century, the Qing Dynasty valued the integrity of the threatened Han empire more than the Mongol privileges. ⁶ In 1906, the Mongol administration department, the Lifanyuan Chamber of External Relations, was transformed into the Ministry of Colonies (Lifanbu). This symbolized a departure from the paternalistic attitude towards Mongol vassals in line with the "new policy" in the territories inhabited by Mongols. The core of this course was the Chinese colonization of the Mongol lands and their transformation into ordinary provinces of China.⁷ Accordingly, the situation of Hulunbuir on the eve of the 1911 revolution was characterized by the threat of turning from a privileged part of the empire with a distinctive culture into an ordinary suburb of Heilongjiang Province with a predominant Han population.

RUSSIAN INTERESTS

Almost from the middle of the 19th century, Hulunbuir was part of the sphere of Russian economic, political and cultural influence, becoming the object of agreements between Russia and the Qing Empire - including the secret Treaty of Alliance between the Russian Empire and China of 1896 directed against Japan, which also provided for the construction of the China-Eastern Railway (CER).

The general Political Convention between Russia and Japan in 1912 established the line of demarcation of interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. According to this agreement (Articles 1 and 2), the zone of influence of the Russian government, in addition to Outer Mongolia, also included Barga (Hulunbuir district), where the western section of the CER was located. Since 1907, the Russian Empire has had its own vice-consulate in Hailar.

With the construction of the CER in all of Northern Manchuria, including in Barga, there were major changes in the number and composition of the population, industry emerged, agriculture began to grow rapidly, and crafts developed. Even during its construction, thousands of Russian workers came here to earn money. Many of them stayed here forever, settling in the pier strip of Barga. Russian railway workers and craftsmen also appeared here. Finally, since the construction of the CER in Barga, the Russian peasant population began to increase, also settling mainly along the railway.

Russia due to economic restrictions (500-kilometer section of the CER) and for geopolitical reasons (the proximity of the Russian border), it was interested in strengthening its influence in this region. Thus, it condemned itself to the role of the main support in the national liberation struggle of the Barguts. In early 1912, Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov wrote to Schekin, Charge d'affaires in Beijing: "... as far as we know, the Mongols do not trust the promises of the Chinese government made without our guarantee. " ⁸

Russia had a certain position in Barga, as it was appealed to by high-ranking Mongolian figures, who considered it the most important external support for achieving independence from China. In 1909, the Russian government appointed P. K. Usatyi, a Chinese expert, as a vice-consul in Hailar. The Russian diplomat was active among the Mongolian elite, taking part in meetings of princes and lamas of the Barginsky districts. Establishing personal friendly relations with the Mongol elite, the Russian vice-consul, according to the Chinese version, caused discord in relations between the Chinese and the Mongols, setting the latter against the Qing government. Although it is obvious that there were pragmatic friendly relations between these two sides that gravitated towards each other.

FIGHT FOR BARGA

On December 1, 1911, Mongolia's independence was proclaimed in Urga (now Ulaanbaatar). On December 29, the ceremony of enthroning the eighth Buddhist head of Mongolia, Bogdo-gegen Jebzun Dambakhutukhta, was held as the "great Khan" of Mongolia. He began the struggle for the incorporation of Barga into his own state, ⁹ which was made more acute by the fact that, as early as the beginning of 1912, Barga was already a part of the state.

Barga, and after it 39 of the 49 counties of Inner Mongolia, seized by a general uprising, declared their accession to the monarchy of Bogdo-gegen.

On January 15, 1912, as a result of the Bargut uprising, Hulunbuir was declared independent. The rebels, led by Shengfu, occupied the city of Hulun (now Hailar), claiming to join the Mongol state as an autonomous aimag. In Hailar, according to the Chinese version of events, the rebels found the support of the Russian Vice-consul P. K. Usatyi, who allegedly gave them 500 rifles. On February 3, at 5 a.m., the rebels attacked Lubin (now Manchuria). Although initially military happiness was on the side of the Chinese: allegedly under pressure from the Russian cavalry and infantry with a total of 800 people, supported by three cannons, they stopped resisting. In Manchuria and Jilaling (now Shiwei), Russian military personnel, according to Chinese historiographers, took direct part in the fighting; during the fighting in Manchuria, five Russian soldiers were killed ¹⁰.

However, the charge d'affaires in Beijing, Schekin, wrote to the Consul General in Harbin, Poppa: "According to the guidelines of the Imperial Ministry, we are advised neither to interfere in the ongoing struggle, nor to support any of the parties that have come into conflict... It is our duty to warn every new authority of the strictly neutral nature of the China-Eastern Railway, within the limits of which there can be no unrest. Please send a copy of this telegram to Generals Horvath and Martynov and by post to the Consuls in Jilin and Qiqihar for their information. " ¹¹ Obviously, the Consulate in Qiqihar could not fail to acquaint the Vice-Consul in Hailar, as the head of an independent consular post, with these instructions.

The initial demands to China from the side of Hulunbuir, which declared independence, were as follows::

- Chinese officials are removed from Hulunbuir, administrative powers are transferred to the Mongolian aimag;

- Chinese troops withdraw from Hulunbuir;

- China is not allowed to send migrants to Hulunbuir again;

- those Chinese who do not submit to the control of the Mongolian aimag are removed from the borders of Hulunbuir;

- all customs duties, as well as all local fees for the use of natural resources, are collected by the administration of the Mongolian aimag ¹².

Russia sought a commitment from China not to carry out any civil and military reforms in Hulunbuir, a zone of Russian interests, without the consent of the Russian government, to abandon its colonization, not to send its troops there, and not to persecute and repress the organizers of the uprising. On April 2, 1912, the Russian charge d'affaires in Beijing had an explanation with Yuan Shikai and received an answer that"the Chinese do not mean to suppress the movement among the Mongols by armed force; it is intended to reach a compromise by peaceful means" ¹³.

The Russian Vice Consul in Hailar declared Russia's neutrality and refusal to take any part in the Chinese events. At the same time, the Russian administration banned the admission of both Chinese and Mongolian troops to the exclusion zone of the CER and denied the Chinese side military transportation by road.

According to modern Chinese historians, this circumstance was the main reason for the success of the Shengfu uprising, since his Mongol cavalry then numbered only 200 sabres, and the total number of troops subordinate to him was less than 1000 people. These forces could have been effectively resisted by the Chinese if the Russians had not refused to transport Chinese troops along the CER. In May 1912, Bogdo-gegen granted Shenfu the title of prince, imperial relative of the 4th degree. Shengfu came to govern Hulunbuir as His Majesty's minister ¹⁴.

After the proclamation of an autonomous aimag within Mongolia in Khulunbuir in 1912, the Russians took an active part in the development of the region's natural resources, signing more than 50 contracts with the Barguts for logging, mining, raising virgin lands and fishing. Since that time, the history of industrial fishing on Lake Hulun ¹⁵ begins, which is associated with the names of Russian industrialists Kataev, Bushmakin and Borisov ¹⁶.

On November 3, 1912, an intergovernmental Russo-Mongolian Agreement was signed in Urga; no consensus was found on Barga.¹⁷ Russia expressed its position in a secret note stating that the tsarist government reserved the right to choose which areas, other than the Outermost Mongolia, it would extend its rights to autonomy. ¹⁸ In 1914, after the outbreak of World War I, China's border regions became a center for purchasing goods for the army. The Russians practically monopolized the trade in meat, fish, fodder, bread, leather and wool, ensuring the rapid development of trade and industry in the region.¹⁹ In the Barge, which is crossed by the CER and open to international trade, Russia was particularly interested in supporting the central government, which covers all of China.²⁰

As early as 1913, the Ministry of War demanded that diplomats ensure peace in the Far East21. Russia abandoned plans to annex the Hulunbuir district to autonomous Mongolia and acted as a mediator, signing an agreement with China in October 1915, according to which Barga was declared a special district subordinate to the central Chinese government.-

with reservations about the need to "warn Russia" and obtain "permission from local authorities"²². The Russian authorities in this case acted on the basis of their own political interests and capabilities, which only partially and not in all coincided with the aspirations of the leaders of the Mongolian national liberation movement. On November 6, 1915, by decree of the President of the Republic of China, Shenfu 23 was appointed the first ^futudong (viceroy, head of the military district) by agreement with Russia.

CIVIL WAR AND LIQUIDATION OF MONGOLIAN AUTONOMY IN BARGA

On March 2, 1917, the first news came to Chita about the February events in Petrograd, about the fall of the autocracy. On March 4, Councils of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies were established in Chita, and later in other localities. On June 21, 1917, when Russia and neighboring Transbaikalia were in a state of revolutionary crisis, Hailar, the administrative center of Barga, was occupied by a Mongol detachment of 6 thousand people under the leadership of Babujab. Shengfu fled to Qiqihar, where he requested help from the Chinese government in Beiping (Beijing), indicating that the Japanese were behind the rebellion. Babujab, meanwhile, appealed to Russia and Khalkha for support, but received no response. The rebellion was suppressed by Chinese troops from Heilongjiang Province, ²⁴ after which the Hulunbuir viceroyalty, which existed here until 1912, was actually restored in Barga, headed by the same Shenfu. Obviously, the Chinese refrained from officially withdrawing from the 1915 Hulunbuir Agreement with Russia, waiting for the outcome of the Russian turmoil.

In September 1917, an anti-Chinese performance of Harachin and Chakhar troops with the participation of Japanese soldiers and officers took place in Inner Mongolia. In December, in Hailar-the center of the Hulunbuir special district - the process of lapping them to the forces of G. M. Semenov of the ^25th Special Manchurian Detachment (OMO) began.

After the overthrow of the Provisional Government of Russia in October 1917, the Government of the Republic of China refused to cooperate with Soviet Russia and recalled its representative to Beijing. The revolutionary crisis led to the weakening of Russia in the international arena and the collapse of the economy. China, which joined the allied military bloc Entente in the summer of 1917, did not take an active part in foreign military intervention in eastern Russia, but Beijing's policy had a great influence on the entire course of the civil war and foreign intervention. ²⁶ Since that time, Barga has been transformed from an object of Russian military and diplomatic efforts into a base for anti-Soviet forces ' actions against Transbaikalia. As early as December 1917, Chinese troops began to occupy the CER, reach the border line, get involved in the conflict between the whites and the Reds, and threaten to occupy Russian cities and towns. ²⁷

On the night of December 19, 1917, G. M. Semenov's detachment took part in the disarmament by Chinese troops of the Russian 724th foot squad located in the village of Manchuria and the dissolution of the Manchurian Council of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies. ²⁸ By January 10, 1918, the OMO, in addition to Russian Cossacks and Buryats, numbered 300 Mongols-Barguts, 80 Mongols-Kharachen. Within four months, relying on the financial and material assistance of the Japanese, the detachment grew to 3 thousand people. By April, the unit had two Mongol-Harachen regiments; the two infantry regiments also included Chinese and Japanese battalions. [²⁹]

On January 23, 1918, the Russian Vice-consul in Hailar addressed the Trans-Baikal Regional Commissar with an attitude* about the dangerous intention of the Chinese government to violate the Barge Treaty of 1915 with Russia.³⁰

On August 20, 1918, having received news of the defeat of the Red troops on Lake Baikal, Ataman Semenov's detachment again set out from Manchuria. On September 6, the OMO vanguard and the Japanese entered Chita.

* Attitude (obsolete) - an official letter (editor's note).

assumes full authority ³¹.

The Japanese historian, Professor Hosoya Chihiro, wrote in his work "A Study of the History of the Siberian Expedition", published in 1976: : "One of the strategic lines pursued by the Japanese emperor was the policy of creating counter-revolutionary "puppet regimes" in order to indirectly strengthen their control over the territory of Siberia. In the course of achieving this goal, the first candidate for the role of a puppet was Grigory Semyonov... Having made his base in Northern Manchuria, he began to create anti-Bolshevik detachments there, relying on Manchuria as a rear bridgehead. At the beginning of January 1918, these detachments gained sufficient strength, crossed the border and entered Siberia. The Japanese army was the first to establish contact with Semyonov. The hopes pinned on Semyonov were limited to passing him off as a champion of "independence and independence", to implement the line of its General Staff to use Semyonov to consolidate its dominance over Transbaikalia, or more precisely, its sole control over the Trans-Baikal Railway. " ³²

In November 1918, the Burnyardum People's Duma of the Buryats of Eastern Siberia was created, which decided to create aimach detachments of the Ulan Tsagda National Guard. By 1919, the goals of the Buryat national movement in Transbaikalia were mostly achieved: national self-government bodies operated on the separate territory of the Buryat departments, ³³ which contributed to the growth of the ideas of pan-Mongolia - the unity of the Mongol-speaking peoples into a single state. This idea was supported by the Japanese.

The Japanese put forward a plan for the formation of a "Great Mongolian State", assuming to unite under their protectorate Outer and Inner Mongolia, as well as Barga, which were part of China, and Buryat Mongolia, which was part of Russia. Japan tried to implement this project through G. M. Semenov. China, concerned about the activity of Japan, taking advantage of the civil war in Russia and in Transbaikalia, decided to regain full control of Barga.

On February 25, 1919, the Pan-Mongolian congress of representatives of Buryatia, Inner Mongolia, and Barga opened in Chita, with Japanese observers present. The Congress decided to form an independent federal "Great Mongolian State", which was to include Inner and Outer Mongolia, Barga and the lands of the Trans-Baikal Buryats. The capital of the future state was to be the city of Hailar in Manchuria. Since it was occupied by Chinese troops, the government temporarily stationed at the Dauria station. G. M. Semenov issued 1 million rubles from Japanese loans for the needs of the new state, weapons and other material assistance. The Panmongolists offered bogdo-gegen the post of constitutional monarch in a federation called "Greater Mongolia" ^.34

The spread of pan-Mongol ideas was followed with alarm in China, seeing in this the possibility of losing Barga, Inner and Outer Mongolia. Despite the veil of secrecy, China knew about the congress through a system of bribing Mongol princes. No one doubted that if "Great Mongolia" suddenly appeared on the map, it would depend entirely on Japan: Tokyo was trying to assert its influence in Central Asia and push out rivals during the era of revolutionary turmoil in Russia and political fragmentation in China. This, in turn, caused dissatisfaction with the United States, England and France.³⁵

After the refusal of Outer Mongolia to participate in the "Buryat-Bargut venture", Semenov undertook the mobilization of a corps from Bargut in Dauria for the purpose of marching on Urga. The Government of Outer Mongolia was forced to turn to the Chinese for help and ask them to deploy Chinese detachments on their eastern border adjacent to Transbaikalia and Barga. This was contrary to the trilateral Russo-Sino-Mongolian agreement of 1915, but Beijing readily responded. ³⁶

In December 1919, when Shenfu ³⁷ died of illness in Hailar, additional Chinese troops were sent to Barga. January 28, 1920 was followed by a decree of the President of the Republic of China, which declared the elimination of Barga's independence as a fait accompli. Noting Russia's interest, the decree noted that the Chinese government would enter into negotiations with the Russian government on this issue in due course.³⁸

With the beginning of the Japanese evacuation, it became clear that the days of white power in the Trans-Baikal Territory were numbered. On October 25, 1920, the government of the Far Eastern Republic* moved to Chita; in November, the remnants of Semenov's units moved to Barga, which was controlled by the Chinese military. Sovremennik wrote: "At night, the small village of Manchuria presented an unusual appearance. Men, horses, implements, and carts scurried about in the midst of countless bonfires... "Kappel's eagles handed over their weapons to the Chinese authorities." ³⁹

* * *

Thus, Barga was not a passive object of Russia's policy in China: the Mongolian elite skilfully used to their advantage such domestic political developments.-

* The Far Eastern Republic (FAR East) is a "buffer" state entity in the Far East between Soviet Russia and Japan, created on the initiative of the leadership of the RSFSR (1920-1922). After the defeat of the White Guard and Japanese troops, its territory became part of the RSFSR (editor's note).

** Kappel V. O. - Commander of the Kolchak Eastern Front (editor's note).

such complications as the collapse of the Qing Empire and the beginning of the Xinhai Revolution, as well as the revival of the medieval ideology of pan-Mongolism. The Russian Government discussed only the possible autonomy of Outer Mongolia within China, without including Inner Mongolia and Barga.⁴⁰ The Russian cabinet's desired formulation of the Mongol question was not to separate the Mongol-inhabited territories from China, but "to preserve Mongolia as an autonomous region within the Chinese Empire." ⁴¹

The Barghut revolt under the leadership of Shengfu was the result of a complex set of reasons: the international and domestic political situation, complicated national relations, and bullying by corrupt Chinese officials42. Successive changes in the correlation of domestic political factors in Russia and China, and changes in the international situation in connection with the outbreak of World War I served as prerequisites for a consistent chain of events-from the proclamation of Hulunbuir's independence from China in 1912 and its autonomy as part of the re-established Mongolian state, through reaching an agreement with China on giving Hulunbuir the status of a and, finally, until its full return to China in 1920 with the loss of autonomy as a result of the loss of the guarantor of preserving the special status in the person of Russia after the fall of the government of A.V. Kolchak in 1919.

The 1917 revolution in Russia led to changes in Russian-Chinese relations both at the interstate and interregional levels in Eastern Transbaikalia and Barga. The civil war led to the loss of Russia's position in Manchuria and control over the CER. At the same time, Beijing's policy had a major impact on the entire course of the civil war and foreign intervention in Transbaikalia.

During this historical period, the peculiarity of Russian-Chinese relations in the Trans-Baikal Region and adjacent regions was revealed, which consisted in the presence of the Mongolian issue, which is important for both sides, and the active use by Russia and an external factor (Japan) of the national liberation movement of the Mongols to strengthen the sphere of their own interests in Hulunbuir. At the same time, Russia has avoided completely withdrawing the Barga from China, fearing problems with its own Buryat-Mongolian population, which has become the object of political manipulation by Japan.

^{Titarenko M. L.} 1 Russia and its Asian partners in the globalizing world. Strategic Cooperation: Problems and Prospects, Moscow, Forum Publishing House, 2012, p. 78.

^{Anuchin V. A.} 2 Geograficheskie ocherki Manzhurii [Geographical Essays of Manchuria], Moscow, OGIZ, State Publishing House of Geographical Literature, 1948, p. 139.

³ Ibid., pp. 140-141.

^{Nepomnin O. E.} 4 Istoriya Kitay: Epokha Tsin. XVII - nachalo XX veka [History of China: The Epoch of the Qing. XVII-the beginning of the XX century]. Moscow, Vostochny lit., 2005, p. 82.

⁵ Istoriya Mongolii XX vek [History of Mongolia in the XX century]. Moscow, IV RAS, 2007, p. 15.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 16-17.

⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

⁸ Minister of Foreign Affairs to charge d'affaires a.i. in Beijing Shchekin. Telegram No. 4. January 15/2, 1912 / / International relations in the era of imperialism, vol. XIX, part p. p. 1.

⁹ History of Mongolia XX century ... P. 37.

¹⁰ Hailar'er feng yun lu (Record of events in Hailar history). Hailar, 2000. p. 79.

¹¹ Charge d'affaires a.i. in Beijing to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Telegram No. 178. 20 / 7february 1912 / / International relations in the era of imperialism ... p. 164.

¹² Haila'er feng yun lu ... p. 82.

¹³ Charge d'affaires a.i. in Beijing to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Telegram No. 331. April 2 / March 20, 1912 / / International relations in the era of imperialism ... pp. 367-368.

¹⁴ Hulunbeier zhi. Description of Hulunbuir. Khailar, Publishing House Culture of Inner Mongolia, 1999. Vol. 3. P. 2360.

¹⁵ During the construction of the CER, fishing on Lake Hulun (Dalai Nor) was banned as insulting the religious beliefs of the local population.

^{Taskina E.} 16 Harbin-a product of contacts of neighboring countries / / Problems of the Far East, 1999, N 4.

¹⁷ History of Mongolia XX century ... p. 39.

¹⁸ Istoriya Mongol'skoy Narodnoi Respubliki [History of the Mongolian People's Republic], Moscow, 1987, p. 269.

^{Xu Zhanjiang, Xu Zhanxin.} 19 Biancheng Manzhouli (Border Town of Manchuria). Hailar, Neimengu wenhua chubanshe, 1992, pp. 40-41.

²⁰ History of Mongolia XX century ... P. 56.

^{Timofeev O. A.} 21 Russian-Chinese relations in the Amur region (ser. XIX - early XX century). XX centuries). Blagoveshchensk, 2003.

²² Russian-Chinese Agreement on the Hulunbuir District. Russko-kitayskie kontraktno-pravovye akty (1689-1916) [Russian-Chinese contractual and legal acts (1689-1916)]. Moscow, Pamyatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2004, pp. 428-430.

²³ Hulunbeier zhi ... p. 2360.

²⁴ Haila'er feng yun lu ... p. 90.

^Datsyshenkov V. G. Chinese in Siberia in the XVII-XX centuries: problems of migration and adaptation. Krasnoyarsk, SibFU Publ., 2008, p. 139.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 140.

²⁷ Ibid.

^{Vasilevsky V. I.} 28 The Trans-Baikal Cossack Host during the Revolution and Civil War. Chita, 2007. p. 38.

^{29. Konstantinov A.V., Konstantinova N. N.} 29 Transbaikalia: stages of History (1917-1922). Chita, Express Publishing House, 2009. p. 35.

³⁰ GACHO. F. 334. Zabaikalsky regional commissioner. Op. 1. d. 30. P. 26.

^{Konstantinov A.V., Konstantinova N. N.} 31 Edict. soch. P. 48.

^{Hosoya Chihiro.} 32 Shibariya shuppaino rakishiteki kenkyu (A study of the history of the Siberian Expedition). Tokyo, Shinsensha Publ., 1976, pp. 135-136.

^{Konstantinov A.V., Konstantinova N. N.} 33 Edict. soch. P. 66.

^{Yuzefovich L. A.} 34 Autocrat of the Desert. The phenomenon of the fate of Baron R. F. Ungern-Sternberg, Moscow, 1993, p. 56.

^{Konstantinov A.V., Konstantinova N. N.} 35 Edict. soch. P. 67.

^{Luzyanin S. G.} 36 Russia-Mongolia-China in the first half of the XX century. Political relations in 1911-1946, Moscow, IDV RAS, 2000, pp. 72-73.

³⁷ Hulunbeier zhi...

³⁸ Haila'er feng yun lu ... p. 99.

Kappelevtsy v Zabaikalie [Kappelevtsy v Zabaikalie] / / Kappel i kappelevtsy, Moscow, Posev Publ., 2003, p. 264.

^{Luzyanin S. G.} 40 Decree. Op. p. 45.

⁴¹ Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Nikolai P. January 23/10, 1912 / / International relations in the era of imperialism ... p. 37.

⁴² Haila'er feng yun lu ... p. 76.

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