K. M. TRUEVTSEV

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: Libya, terrorist threat, political instability, radical Islamists, ethnic and tribal separatism, jihadism, illegal migration

Against the background of the war raging today in vast areas of the Middle East, events taking place on the African continent are being overshadowed by the attention of the world community. Meanwhile, reports coming from North Africa, the Sahel and sub-Saharan States indicate that the entire vast region is turning into a zone of growing terrorist danger and political instability, which risks becoming a zone of permanent regional conflict.

The echoes of these events are also directly felt in the Mediterranean region, primarily in the form of growing illegal migration to Europe from Africa, which is already the second most important source of mass displacement of people to the EU countries. The epicenter of all these threats is Libya. It is impossible to prevent their further spread without eliminating or at least stopping the Libyan hotbed.

At the same time, the task of applying international efforts to solve the Libyan problem is far from simple, and in a certain sense even more complex than the task of countering jihadist forces in Syria and Iraq. First of all, the point is that, unlike these two Middle Eastern states, there are practically no internal actors in Libya who would have a clear prospect of becoming a consolidating national force.

INTERNAL SITUATION

Libya today is a fully disintegrated State, whose internal fragmentation is extreme and multidimensional, even by modern Middle Eastern and African standards. Not only did the links between its historical regions - Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan-break down, but these territories also became fragmented into smaller fragments, many of which have neither a stable power nor a definite political structure.

The political poles for a long time were, on the one hand, the General National Congress (GNA) located in the capital, formed on the basis of elections, and the government created by it, and on the other, the government located in Tobruk in the north - east of the country, formed on the basis of the parliament that moved here in 2014 from Tripoli. After the appearance of the UN-sponsored Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli in early 2016 and the formal resignation of the leadership of the GNA and the Government it formed, the overall situation has not changed much. Since the power of the NTC in Tripoli remains elusive, and the government in Tobruk continues to operate independently of it, the territorial-political bipolarity of power remains.

Deep contradictions between the two centers of power are connected-

This article is based on the publication of K. Truevtsev and O. Bulaev "Libya: a disintegrated state and a hotbed of regional tension" / / Estimates and Ideas. Bulletin of the Institute of Information Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 9, May 2016.

They are characterized by the nature of the political forces dominating them. The political trends represented in the Tripoli GNC included representatives of the former officers of the Jamahiriya army who took part in the operation "Libyan Dawn" directed against Gaddafi, as well as representatives of various militias and various tribal forces. However, Islamists played a decisive role in it, primarily the Justice and Development Party, which is a political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The GNC's legislative activity was based on attempts to combine sharia law with elements of formal and largely conventional democracy. The real system of governance was built on the basis of informal agreements with the commanders of local militias, some of which have a radical Islamist orientation, while others are criminal communities, and the difference between them is often blurred.

At the same time, before 2013, not only a number of foreign analysts, but also representatives of local political forces were inclined to consider the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, by analogy with the Egyptian ones, as representatives of moderate Islamist forces, but after the mass uprising of their opponents supported by the army, the picture in Egypt began to change rapidly. Since the NTC's arrival in Tripoli, little has changed in this respect, except perhaps for the greater foreign policy legitimacy of the current government, which is based on international recognition. However, in fact, the NTC is forced to rely on the same political forces as the VNK, which in fact continues to maintain its position of shadow power here.

As for the influence of the Islamist factor in the political power in Tripoli, it is not just the radicalization of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood that took place in the first years of post-Gaddafi Libya, but also the fact that at that time the Ansar al-Sharia organization, which is the Libyan branch of Al-Qaeda, began to gain strength sharply.Qaeda." This is despite the fact that the boundaries between it and the Muslim Brotherhood began to blur: somewhere it was just about changing the sign, somewhere about cooperation, and somewhere about the flow of one into the other.

Therefore, it is no coincidence that in 2014, after the rise of pro-Islamist forces in Tripoli, secular forces represented at the political level decided to create a separate center of power in Tobruk, transferring there a legally elected and internationally recognized parliament. The government in Tobruk relies on this elected parliament, which represents the interests of the modernized urban population, large and medium-sized businesses, the secular part of the army, and tribal elites. The strongman of the Tobruk regime was General Khalifa Haftar. As a participant in the Libyan revolution of 1969, and then appointed by Gaddafi as chief of the general staff, he commanded Libyan troops during the war in Chad in 1987. The Libyan leader blamed him for the defeat. After X was released from custody. Haftar left the country and lived in exile in the United States, and in 2011 joined the uprising in Benghazi.

However, one of the central problems is that both Governments control only small parts of the country's territory, mainly in its coastal zone. The Tobruk Government, which took over most of Cyrenaica in 2014, exercises relative control over the eastern province's capital, Benghazi, and its authority extends as far west as the major oil port of Ras Lanuf.

So far, even in this territory, his army has to engage in constant clashes with Islamist detachments. And the real power of the government in Tripoli is mainly limited to the capital and its immediate suburbs, since both in the west of it - in the area of Bratta and further along the border with Tunisia, and in the east, starting with Misrata, the zone of influence of radical Islamists and local militias that it does not control begins. Prior to 2014, Ansar al-Sharia and its associated groups held a dominant position in these areas (as well as in some parts of Cyrenaica, including Benghazi), but since late 2014, and especially in 2015, the Islamic State (IS)has been gaining increasing influence in Libya. A fierce armed confrontation developed between the two groups, which continues sporadically to this day.

In this confrontation, IS managed to win an important interim victory, which was expressed in the fact that it took control of a part of the coastal strip extending approximately 120 km to the west and east of Sirte, and from the eastern side this strip comes close to the city of Ras Lanuf. ISIS even managed to capture this most important oil port for a short time. However, battles with the army of X have already unfolded here. Haftar, who was able to recapture the port from the Islamists. IS units continue to operate in the suburbs of Benghazi today, and from time to time terrorize this historical capital of Cyrenaica itself.

It should be noted that if the Ansar al-Sharia detachments consist mainly of Libyans, although there are also Islamists from the Maghreb countries (primarily from Tunisia), as well as from Egypt, then the composition of the IG

it differs significantly in national and ethnic terms. The organization's military leader is an Iraqi, the supreme chairman of the Sharia court is a Yemeni, a number of field commanders are citizens of Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, a significant number of recruits are Tunisians, as well as people from Central Africa, who are recruited from among migrants heading to Europe, offering them an impressive salary of $1,000 by African standards. The number of IS fighters was estimated by experts at 2-3 thousand people, but some estimates give a much larger figure-up to 6 thousand. ¹ And this discrepancy in the figures, apparently, is due to the fact that the number of militants increased significantly between the end of 2015 and February-March 2016.

The strengthening of the position of the Islamic State in Libya has led to the fact that its central Middle Eastern leadership began to consider this country as the second most important geopolitical springboard after the Syrian-Iraqi area. There have been reports that ISIS leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who has been given the title of "caliph", is considering moving to Libya in the event of defeat in Syria and Iraq.

The internal political situation in Libya is further complicated by the processes associated with its ethnic and tribal component. Arab nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, as well as ethnic groups, the most important of which are the Berbers, Tuaregs and Negroid Tubu tribes, have played and continue to play a significant role in the development of the situation. Arab nomadic tribes in the center, east, and south of the country were divided during the civil war - some of them supported Gaddafi, while others sided with the armed opposition.

The Berbers, who make up up to 10% of the country's population, mostly live compactly to the west of Tripoli, along the border with Tunisia and Algeria, have become one of the striking forces of the opposition. Moreover, the al-Jabal al-Gharbi region, with its predominantly Berber population, became one of the main areas of the rebel offensive on Tripoli in 2011. However, the current Islamist authorities in Tripoli do not enjoy their support either. Another part of the Berbers, dispersed in the center and east of the country and often mixed with the Arab population, as well as Arab tribes, spoke out in different directions during the events. There were often sporadic demonstrations, mainly related to tribal and clan interests.²

As for the Tuaregs, whose total number reaches 1.5 million people, who live cross-border in Mali, Niger, Algeria and Burkina Faso, and only a small part in Libya, representatives of this predominantly nomadic ethnic group initially sided with Gaddafi, and Tuaregs from neighboring countries flocked to his support. After the overthrow of the Libyan leader, the positions of the Tuareg tribes are undergoing a noticeable transformation. A number of important episodes of their positional alliances with the most radical Islamists from Al-Qaeda in the Arab Maghreb, as well as the Islamic State, were noted, as a result of which their joint raids on the territories of Mali, Algeria, Niger and Burkina Faso became possible.

The Tubu tribes, whose range is also trans-border, covering most of Chad, eastern Niger, western Sudan and southern Libya, supported the uprising against Gaddafi and pledged allegiance to the government in Tripoli. Formed during the Libyan civil war, the Tubu National Salvation Front (NFLF) announced its self-dissolution at the end of 2011. However, in 2012, clashes broke out between police in Sebha, controlled by the Tripoli authorities, and the Zuvaya Arab tribe with the Tubu armed tribes controlling the area, resulting in a confrontation between the Tubu and the VNK, and then with the IS. Therefore, in 2012, the NFTF was re-established with the Tubu national autonomy project, and recently it has been increasingly inclined, like the Tuaregs, to create a separate state covering their cross-border area. In 2015, there was also a sharp deterioration in relations between Tubu and Tuaregs, which led to armed clashes between them3.

Since all three non-Arab ethnic groups (including the Berbers, who also live cross-border) have projects to create their own nation-states, and, as can be seen from the Tuareg example, these projects have one or another perspective of implementation, their positions and in some cases concrete actions only aggravate the state of disintegration of the Libyan state. And since their interests often overlap geographically, the interethnic conflicts that arise on this basis increase the effect of the war of all against all. In any case, the notion that any of the warring parties in Tobruk and Tripoli can control these ethnic and tribal groups would be completely illusory.

One of the latest attempts to achieve reconciliation in Libya by the international community and neighboring Arab States was the signing of a document establishing a Government of national accord in Skhirat, Morocco, on December 17, 2015. This step was supported by the UN. Such a government led by Fayez Faraj was created, but today it seems that this is nothing more than a mere formality. In any case, repeated

F.'s attempts Faraj, who is constantly staying in Tunisia, ended in failure to settle on Libyan territory. When he arrived in Libya in the last decade of March 2016, the head of Government in Tripoli demanded that he leave the country immediately, otherwise threatening him with detention and arrest.

And only later, at the very end of March-beginning of April 2016, under strong pressure from the international community, a number of Western countries and Arab states, the leadership of the GNA and the government it formed were forced to announce their resignation, after which it became possible to start the formal functioning of the NTC. Only formally ,since it has no socio-political support, and it is still forced to limit itself to the support provided by the shadowy structures of the VNK and the forces behind them. Until very recently, the Government of National Accord and the Tobruk authorities did not show any support either.

Thus, the reconciliation project led to the fact that instead of dual power, a three-power system was formed, and the third power, instead of an instrument of national unification, turned into an instrument whose influence in the country is no more than a phantom.

At the same time, the situation with the resignation of the National Salvation Government remains ambiguous. Thus, on April 1, 2016, the day after he announced his resignation, the US Treasury Department announced sanctions against its head, Khalifa al-Gweil, for blocking or undermining the activities of the Government of National Accord.⁴

However, at the beginning of the summer there were some encouraging reports indicating that the NTC may still be able to strengthen its influence in the country. However, these reports were quite contradictory. So, in early June, it was reported that troops subordinate to the NTC, under the command of Colonel Mohammed al-Garsi, entered Sirte and are fighting in the streets of the city, ⁵ and at the end of June, it was reported that the armed forces under the auspices of the NTC were advancing on IS positions not even in the city itself, but only in the Sirte area. ⁶.

This may indicate that the trend of strengthening the positions of the NTC is still visible, but it is at least premature to talk about a significant turn in the situation in its favor, and even more so about the victory over the IG. Moreover, at the same time as the NTC forces advanced on Sirte in the east of the country, the city of Al-Naufalia was liberated from IS militants, but it was not the armed forces operating under the auspices of the NTC that liberated it, but the units subordinate to the government in Tobruk.⁷

One of the most important aspects of the intra-Libyan confrontation was the resource factor. Its three main components should be distinguished: 1. Finance; 2. Oil and other hydrocarbons; 3. Weapons.

The looting of public finances and wealth belonging to the families of Muammar Gaddafi and his inner circle was one of the foundations of the existence of numerous Islamist, criminal and tribal structures. Some part of the State's holdings ended up at the disposal of the Tripoli and Tobruk Governments and still remains an important factor in maintaining their functioning. However, this is clearly not enough to expand the zone of their territorial control, which is necessary in a number of cases to reach agreements with local armed political and tribal groups. Therefore, the oil factor is of particular, if not primary, importance.

The struggle for control over oil fields, transportation and export of oil is no less important in this regard, and in most cases more important than just control over territories. Therefore, when ISIS managed to take the port of Ras Lanuf for a short time, there was a real danger that dominating oil exports would create an even stronger and more stable base for it in Libya in the future than in Iraq and Syria.

The reconquest of Ras Lanuf by Haftar's forces turned the Tobruk government into a more solid center of political power with a resource base that provides a certain prospect of not only preserving, but also further expanding its zone of influence not only in the east, but at least in some areas of Tripolitania. At the same time, there are reports that the Islamic State manages to smuggle oil to Europe using small oil-loading vessels from those settlements that remain under its control on the coast8.

As for the government in Tripoli, its position in the oil industry is more modest compared to the authorities in Tobruk, since the main oil loading ports are located in the east of the country, out of its control.

With regard to Libya, Mao Zedong's famous phrase "A rifle gives birth to power" takes on a special literal and at the same time pluralistic meaning, since the level and scale of power of certain groups depends on the number of weapons and the ability to use them.

SPREAD OF TERRORISM FROM LIBYA TO OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES

The looting of one of Africa's largest weapons arsenals has also had an impact on missile defense-

It should have an impact not only on the entire course of internal confrontation. Modern "wheelbarrows" with large-caliber machine guns and RPGs, armored vehicles and even multiple launch rocket systems have spread from here almost half of the African continent-up to Nigeria, Cameroon and the Central African Republic. This factor has played a significant role in the intensification of interethnic and tribal conflicts in a number of African countries, the spread and strengthening of separatist tendencies, often intertwined with Islamist movements.

The most striking manifestation of these consequences of the collapse of the Libyan state was the events in Mali in the spring of 2012, which led to the country's split. Since the end of March 2012, most of the country has been occupied by the separatist Tuareg Movement for the Liberation of Azawad( DOA), in which, along with the Malian ones, Libyan Tuaregs participated.

In April 2012, the DOA declared the independence of Azawad in the north of the country. Along with the DOA, Ansar al-Din, a Tuareg organization closely linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which includes Algerian, Tunisian and Libyan Islamists and aims to establish a Sharia State, also initially began operating there. It is noteworthy that during the Malian events, AQIM was renamed Al-Qaeda in West Africa (AKZA), which meant its reorientation to activities primarily in non-Arab countries of the continent.

The collapse of the Malian State, in turn, has created a breeding ground for the spread of terrorism to other Sub-Saharan countries, as evidenced by the terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire that followed the 2015 Bomako hotel attack. The proliferation of weapons across the Sahel is fueling Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria and other terrorist groups in neighboring countries, from Cameroon to the Central African Republic. Thus, a broad belt of terrorist activity is being created in the region, which has already covered a number of countries and threatens their neighboring states.

Thus, Libya has become the epicenter of the spread of Islamist terrorism across the vast expanses of the African continent. In addition to the one already described, which is most dangerous due to the openness and complete lack of control of the borders of the southern direction, this danger also extends to other areas of the perimeter of the Libyan borders.

But if in the east this terrorist threat was stopped as a result of the strengthening of the actions of the Egyptian army after the events of 2013, and then the control of the X-army. However, if Haftarah is flying over the eastern part of the country, then the same cannot be said about the western direction.

During the Malian events of 2012, terrorists raided the territory of Algeria, where they took hostages in the area of gas fields in the south-east of the country. The Algerian Armed Forces repelled the terrorist attack, but a large number of hostages, including citizens of other countries, were killed during it. The internal threat of terrorism in Algeria is now reduced to a minimum, but terrorist attacks from the Libyan and Tunisian borders have occurred repeatedly in recent years. After the attack on Ben Gardan, the country's Armed Forces were once again put on full alert due to the danger of a terrorist attack from Libya in ^{March 2016.9}

However, if Algeria is sufficiently well protected from massive terrorist attacks, and they are usually local in nature, in the case of Tunisia, they are considered a national threat. A number of terrorist raids that have been carried out in Tunisia in recent years have taken place from the territory of Libya. And these are not only individual terrorist attacks on a seaside beach, but also a much larger attack near the city of Ben Gardan in early March 2016. Tunisian Islamists, who are located on the territory of Libya and whose number reaches 3 thousand people, are also hatching broader plans to attack Tunisia, which may threaten its state system.

The most immediate threat comes from the territory of Libya and for the European continent. Libya is the second largest source of illegal migration to Europe after Turkey. Although the scale of migration from here today is an order of magnitude smaller than from Turkey, the flow of uncontrolled migrants from Africa has a clear tendency to increase ¹⁰. And since this flow from Libya is under the direct control of Islamists, primarily ISIL, the targeted sending of terrorists in the ranks of migrants is more than a real prospect, if in some cases it is not already a fait accompli.

It follows from this that the Libyan situation, which is already in the focus of attention of the EU countries, should obviously lead to appropriate decisions on the part of the EU, primarily taking into account the potentially growing Islamist threat.

ARAB RESPONSE

The situation in Libya is of constant concern to neighboring Arab countries. However, their positions are not exactly identical.

Formally, all the Arab countries of North Africa share a common position on the need to stop the internal missile defense system-

a peaceful solution of internal problems through dialogue between the warring parties, and the establishment of a Government of national unity on this basis. At the same time, detailing their real positions on the Libyan situation reveals various, sometimes quite significant differences.

Egypt, while emphasizing that direct military intervention from abroad in the intra-Libyan confrontation is counterproductive and will only lead to a worsening of the conflict, actually supports the Tobruk government and army. Haftarah. Once he had to intervene directly in the Libyan events: after the brutal massacre of the IS terrorists over the Egyptian Copts, the Egyptian air force, by the decision of President A. al-Sisi, carried out airstrikes on the positions of the Islamists.

Algeria also opposes direct intervention in the Libyan situation, limiting itself only to operations on the border with Libya in order to prevent Islamists from entering its territory. In 2015, Algeria launched a joint action initiative of the group of neighboring countries of Libya to help the parties to the internal conflict to establish a dialogue. Speaking about the Algerian position, it is impossible not to mention the information about the supply of weapons to the army of X. Haftar's visit to Algeria, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia ^{in 2015.11}

At its most vulnerable, Tunisia announced in early February 2016 that it had completed the construction of a 200-kilometer wall on its border with Libya to prevent the entry of terrorist groups from its territory. At the same time, the Tunisian Defense Ministry strongly opposes the military operation of Western countries in Libya, fearing, first of all, that it will result in a further influx of Libyan refugees to Tunisia.

Morocco, unlike Egypt and Algeria, mainly maintained contacts with the authorities in Tripoli. At the same time, it should be noted that Morocco played a crucial mediation role in supporting the UN efforts to hold a dialogue between representatives of Tripoli and Tobruk in 2015, which resulted in the agreement on the establishment of a Government of national accord on December 17, 2015.

If we talk about the positions of other significant Arab and Middle Eastern countries, their obvious polarization is noticeable here. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, together with Egypt, clearly support the government in Tobruk, and in August 2015, an Egyptian - based air group from the United Arab Emirates conducted a military operation, bombing Islamist positions in Libya.

At the same time, Haftar accused Qatar, Turkey and Sudan of supporting Libyan Islamists. At the same time, it is obvious that the leading role in such support belongs to Qatar, since Turkey is completely absorbed in the actions on the Syrian front and the confrontation with the Kurds. At the same time, Ankara promotes the transit of Islamists to Libya and partly supplies weapons, and the same applies to Sudan in even smaller proportions.

POLITICAL LINE OF WESTERN STATES

Western policy towards Libya, after a period of relative passivity that followed the country's political chaos, the dominance of Islamist and criminal groups, and the brutal murder of the US Ambassador to Benghazi, began to change in the direction of activation in 2014-2015.

In 2015, NATO and the EU began hatching plans for the direct armed participation of these structures, as well as a number of leading Western countries, primarily the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, in the Libyan events - from contacts with the Libyan security forces to a direct armed invasion of Libyan territory.

Already in May 2015, WikiLeaks* made public a number of details of a secret EU plan of armed action (in coordination with NATO) both in the Mediterranean Sea and on land against Libyan civilian infrastructure in order to stop the influx of immigrants to EU countries.

At the end of February 2016, WikiLeaks released a much more detailed plan codenamed "Sofia". It provided for three phases of the operation at sea and in the coastal areas of Libya. The first two-1) training of the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard and 2) operation at sea. Both phases were actually implemented in 2015, with the second phase destroying 67 migrant boats and arresting 46 smugglers. The second phase, which was implemented primarily by Italy, played only a minor role in the overall restriction of the flow of migrants, but was able to redirect this flow from Italy towards Greece.

The third phase of the operation was planned for 2016 in case the formation of the Government of national accord failed and provided for a direct invasion of the armed forces of European countries on Libyan territory. It was supposed to be a duplicate of the ot software-

* WikiLeaks is an international non-profit organization that publishes classified information taken from anonymous sources or when this information is leaked (editor's note).

a similar NATO operation in the event of a failed invasion under the auspices of a military alliance.

Along with these plans, armed formations of a number of NATO countries have already been operating in Libya since 2015. Thus, US special forces soldiers arrived in the country "for contacts" with local law enforcement agencies, but in December, under pressure from local armed groups, they were forced to leave the Libyan territory. At the same time, according to the Qatari Al-Jazeera television channel in February 2016, armed units of the United States, Great Britain and France are currently stationed in Libya. American troops are stationed at the Al-Vatiya Air Force Base in southwestern Tripoli, British troops are stationed at the Nasr air base near Tobruk, and French troops are stationed at a military base near Tobruk, where they work in coordination with units of the X-Army. Haftarah.

On February 19, 2016, US aircraft conducted an airstrike on an IS training camp on the outskirts of Sobrata, west of Tripoli. As a result, 30 militants who arrived from Tunisia were killed. However, the victims of the bombing were also civilians, as well as foreigners - two Serbian citizens.

In early March, TASS, citing The New York Times, reported that the Pentagon had prepared a plan for a military operation in Libya, providing for strikes on command centers, weapons depots and militant training camps. ¹² This plan was presented to Barack Obama, but it has not yet been approved by the American president.

The presence of armed units of Western countries in Libya shows that the political authorities in both Tobruk and Tripoli do not refuse to coordinate actions, including armed ones, with representatives of world centers of power. At the same time, they strongly oppose the armed invasion of the country by these forces. This position is shared by neighboring Arab countries, including Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia.

Speaking of plans for an invasion of Libya, it is impossible not to mention a number of publications in recent months in the Western press, which speak about the desire of a number of European leaders to involve Russia in an armed operation in Libya. Although there has been no official confirmation to this effect, these publications claim to be precedents for probing possible Russian involvement at a high political level.

At the end of March 2016 The EU has decided to impose sanctions against the President of the Chamber of Deputies, i.e. the legally elected Parliament in Tobruk, the Head of the Government of National Salvation and the Chairman of the GNA in Tripoli for trying to obstruct the implementation of the agreement on the formation of the Government of National Accord. Although this is an agreement (from 17 Dec. 2015) was adopted under the auspices and approved by UN decisions, and these decisions did not provide for any sanctions. Therefore, this decision of the EU provoked a protest from the Russian Foreign Ministry as a unilateral measure taken in circumvention of the UN Security Council.

KEY FINDINGS

1. The overthrow of the Gaddafi dictatorship and the civil war in Libya resulted in the collapse of the Libyan state. This disintegration is multi-faceted and multi-layered and is unlikely to be overcome in the foreseeable future, despite all the efforts being made in this direction at the international level.

2. One of the main facts of the current situation is geographically localized dual power. One of the authorities-the internationally recognized Chamber of Deputies and the government formed on its basis-is located in the east of the country in Tobruk, the other - in the person of the VNK and the Government of National Salvation-in Tripoli.

3. The government in Tobruk, which maintains diverse international contacts and relies on the support of a number of the most important Arab countries, primarily Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and partly Algeria, controls most of the territories of Cyrenaica, including the capital of this historical province of Benghazi, as well as the eastern part of the Tripolitanian coast up to the oil port of Ras Lanouf. However, the main part of Tripolitania is not under his control and is unlikely to submit to him in the foreseeable future, as evidenced at least by the defeat inflicted on Haftar's army in Tripoli in 2014 by Islamist detachments and some officers of the former Libyan army during their joint operation "Dawn of Libya".

4. The National Salvation Government in Tripoli is precisely the product of the coalition that has emerged. It lacks formal international recognition, which is primarily due to concerns about the dominance of radical Islamist elements in it. However, it has ties to a number of Middle Eastern countries, most notably Qatar, Turkey and Sudan. Informal contacts with him were carried out both at the international level and by a number of leading countries of the world in connection with the search for ways to resolve the Libyan situation. As for the influence of this government within the country, it does not fully control even certain areas of the capital, let alone its immediate surroundings.

5. However, the greatest danger in the current Libyan situation is represented by radical Islamist organizations operating in the country, which are not subordinate to any of the authorities. First of all, speech

This refers to the "Islamic State", which seized the territory of the coastal zone to the west and east of the city of Sirte. Other parts of the Tripolitanian interior coast are under the control of Al-Qaeda's Libyan affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia, and its affiliated small groups. In addition, some territories and localities are under the control of local militias and criminal groups, which often enter into positional alliances with Islamists.

6. We should not underestimate the danger posed by ethnic separatism emanating from three ethnic groups-Berbers, Tuaregs and Tubus. The former live compactly, mainly in the west of Tripolitania, on the border with Tunisia and Algeria, the second and third, mainly in the southern historical region of the country - Fezzan. All of them claim to create their own statehood, which in all cases has a cross-border character, and enjoy de facto independence in conditions of anarchy. The main danger from such a situation today is that terrorism is spreading to neighboring countries through the territories of these ethnic and tribal groups through positional agreements with Islamists that allow their infiltration into neighboring states with Libya, as well as the transit of weapons outside the country.

7. Libya has become not only a field of militant jihadism on its territory, but also a source of spreading the terrorist threat to the vast expanses of the African continent.

8. Libya is the second largest source of illegal migration to Europe after Turkey, and, unlike the latter, there are no prospects for controlling this process, since there is no legal party capable of assuming such control on Libyan territory. But there is an illegal side, and this is the "Islamic State", which actually monopolized the smuggling of migrants to Europe. This circumstance adds to the problem, since it allows the jihadist enclave to infiltrate militants into Europe in the general flow of migrants.

9. All this makes it clear that the situation in Libya is completely intolerable not only for the neighboring Arab, African and European States, but also for the international community as a whole. This situation requires the development of a comprehensive, systematic plan for its resolution, which is unfortunately still missing.

10. Such a plan could involve a parallel solution to the two-pronged task of eliminating the terrorist hotbed and restoring Libyan statehood. It is precisely re-establishment, not strengthening, or even restoration, since there are no conditions for direct restoration of state power. At the same time, it is not a fact that it will be possible to do this within the framework of previously existing borders, but today more than half of them are missing.

11. Unfortunately, the efforts made by the UN, NATO, the EU, and neighboring Arab countries are not coordinated, and a number of steps planned and taken by Western countries are more reactive than strategic in nature and hardly take into account all possible consequences.

12. Reaching an agreement under the auspices of the United Nations on the establishment of a Government of national accord is undoubtedly a positive step. However, sending such a Government to Tripoli clearly without going through all the necessary procedures to guarantee its support from the existing authorities in Tripoli and Tobruk, finding and gradually expanding the field of agreement with local power groups, seems to be a premature step. Especially when this step is accompanied by an act of EU sanctions pressure on the Tripoli and Tobruk authorities. This raises serious doubts about the capacity of such a Government. In addition, the mechanisms of functioning of this Government are still completely unclear.

13. However, since April 2016, there have been some signs of positive developments around the Government of National Accord. First of all, these are reports about the resignation of the Tripoli government and the leadership of the GNK, as well as the return of a number of embassies to Tripoli.

14.Plans to target terrorist infrastructure are unlikely to raise objections on their own, but numerous experiences in recent decades have shown that they are ineffective if not accompanied by a ground operation. At the same time, a ground operation will be successful only if it is carried out by local forces supported by the population, and foreign support is only auxiliary in nature.

15. Attempts at foreign invasion, as the Libyan experience of 2011-2012 has already shown, will inevitably alienate the local population and, ultimately, lead to an expansion of the social base of terrorists.

16. In addition to attempts to facilitate the activities of the Government of National Accord, and even in the event of its failure, it is necessary to continue contacts with the Tripoli and Tobruk parties in order to expand the field of national accord, as well as to look for ways to expand this field with non-subordinate local armed groups, using, inter alia, the following methods:-

<url>, positive experience of signing agreements with similar groups at the Khmeimim base in Syria.

17. Separate negotiations should be held with ethnic groups of Berbers, Tuaregs and Tubus, and the subject of these negotiations should be, first of all, guarantees of preventing terrorist activities, refusal of position agreements with terrorists, arms and migration transit in exchange for financial and economic assistance. The European Union could play a leading role here: instead of providing significant non-targeted assistance to African countries, cooperation with Libyan ethnic and tribal groups can achieve a much greater effect at a lower cost, while at the same time tying up the freedom of the hands of terrorists from southern Libya and closing the transit routes of migrants even on the distant approaches to Europe.

18.Stopping the transit of terrorists from Turkish territory could play a positive role in the development of events in Libya. Given the steps taken and being taken by Turkey to normalize relations with Russia and Egypt, this topic could be the subject of appropriate negotiations.

19. Measures are needed to involve former Libyan army officers in the zone of national accord and the fight against terrorists, especially ISIL, presenting them as a foreign force for Libya. And this is especially true not so much for Cyrenaica, where they are already under the control of X. Haftarah, how much for Tripolitania, where the officers are in a state of ideological confusion.

20. In Libya, especially in Tripolitania, unlike in Syria, it may be productive to find moderate Islamist elements and groups and involve them in the process of national accord. Here, perhaps, the experience of Chechnya could be useful.

21. Russia could take initiatives in this area. The experience of its counter-terrorism operations in the Caucasus, especially in Chechnya, where a comprehensive approach to eliminating terrorist hotbeds and restoring State power proved to be productive. It is worth mentioning that the structures subordinate to Ramzan Kadyrov have experience in interacting with the Tripoli authorities, which resulted in the release of Russian sailors.

22. Russia's participation in any armed operations in Libya is completely excluded. Unlike Syria, the Libyan situation, for all its dangers, does not directly pose a threat to Russia, and any military involvement in it would only distract the Russian forces from other, much more urgent potential threats.

¹ A number of experts, referring to UN data from November 2015, indicate the number of IS fighters in Libya in the amount of 2-3 thousand people (See, for example, Oleg Yegorov. "Caliphate" in Africa: Why the "Islamic State" in Libya is for a long time / / Meduza Project, April 7, 2016 - http:medusa.io/feature/2016/04/07/halifat-africa. In the same place, with reference to the CNN material based on US intelligence data, but already for February 2016, the figure of 6.5 thousand people is given. Similar information with only a slight discrepancy in the last figure "about 6 thousand people" is given in the article of the newspaper "Kommersant" dated 17.04.2016 "The UN noticed the activation of the "Islamic State " in Libya".

^{Edwin Lane} 2 / Air Force, Tripoli. Libyan Berbers (Amazigh) demand recognition of independence. 21.06.2012 / / Website of the community "For Gaddafi and his people" - zakaddafi.org/node/11958

³ Factor tuba. Consequences of the Libyan War in Sahrawi politics / / Military Review. 5 августа 2015 -topwar.ru/80013-factor-tubu-posledstviya-liviyskoy-voyny-v-saharskoy-politike.html

⁴ The United States imposed sanctions against the head of the self-proclaimed government of Libya / / TASS, International Panorama, April 19, 2016 - tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3221285

⁵ Mass media: Libyan government forces entered Sirte , the main stronghold of the Islamic State in Libya / / TASS, International Panorama, June 3, 16: 11 - tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3338007

⁶ The forces of the Libyan National Security Council are advancing in the southern areas of the IS-occupied Sirte / / RT in Russian, June 28, 2016-https: Russian.rt.com/article/310000-sily-pns-livii-vedut-nastuplenie-v-yuzhnyh

⁷ TASS, June 3, 2016.

^{Topalov A.} 8 IG goes for the Libyan oil. Газета.ги, 14.12.2015 - www.gazeta.ru/business/2015/12/14/7966985.shtml; El Murid. Libya, oil and ISIS 30 November 2015 -el-murid.livejournal.com/2597260.html

⁹ In Algeria, the level of alarm in the troops was raised to martial law / / PRONEDRA, 09.03.2016, 01.13 -pronedra.ru/weapon/2016/03/alzhir-terroristy-uroveni-trevogi

¹⁰ In the article by I. O. Babynina and V. A. Kuznetsov "The EU and the Maghreb countries" in the book " The European Union in search of a global role "(Moscow, Vse Mir 2015, pp. 535-536), with reference to official EU data, it was noted that in 2014 170 thousand migrants were registered in these countries In the first three months of 2015, the number of migrants from the European Union came from the Maghreb countries, and in the first three months of 2015, their number was 100 thousand, and 80% of people smuggling from these countries was carried out from the territory of Libya.

¹¹. Will Khalifa Haftar become the dictator of Libya? 5.03.2015 - geo-politika.info/stanet-li-khalifa-khaftar-dictatorom-livii.html. Reprint of an article by John Lee Andersen of The New Yorker.

¹² NYT: The Pentagon presented Obama with a plan for a military operation against ISIS in Libya / / TASS. 8 марта 2016 - tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2723369

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