L. M. ISAEV

Candidate of Political Sciences

A. V. KOROTAEV

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Higher School of Economics, Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

L. E. GRININ

Doctor of Philosophy

National Research University "Higher School of Economics" , Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: Egypt, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Muslim Brotherhood, army, forces of evil, Ismail Pasha, megaprojects

On June 3, 2016, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi took part in one of the country's most popular television programs, 100 Minutes, during which he answered questions from the famous journalist Osama Kamal. Thus, the head of state actually summed up the results of his two-year presidency, identifying the main trends in both political and economic development of Egypt.

In his speech, el-Sisi focused on two fundamental tasks for modern Egypt: the need for national consolidation against the "forces of evil" and the implementation of large infrastructure projects that can warm up the Egyptian economy in the future.

THE INSTINCT OF SELF-PRESERVATION

The need to unite against all those who, according to the succinct definition of the Egyptian president, are now commonly defined as" forces of evil " is now becoming one of the most important, if you will, ideological components of the al-Sisi administration. It is noteworthy that during his speech, the head of state never specified who exactly should be included in this category, noting that "the Egyptian people know who they are talking about."¹

It is obvious that this collectively means all the opponents of the current regime, taken together-from the Muslim Brotherhood and radicals who have traditionally settled in the Sinai Peninsula, to young people who are very susceptible to influence from "persons with ulterior motives... and who can harm the national interests of the state"². Which, in general, is quite understandable.

Egypt today faces a situation typical of many societies that are more or less unprepared for democratic transformation and are still in the incomplete stages of modernization, when the paths of democracy and revolution must sooner or later diverge. And there are a number of reasons for this.

First, after the "January 25" revolution of 2011, it became clear that democracy alone is absolutely not enough to achieve the goals of the revolution, and you will not be "fed up" with democracy alone. Democracy is ideally conceived as a means by which a bad government can be replaced with a good one, which will automatically lead the country to prosperity. In reality, of course, this cannot be the case. Specific and competent management is required to deal with specific cases. But revolutionaries, as a rule, are not able to do this. They either have to leave the old functionaries and technocrats in power, who are professionals in one way or another, but in this case everything goes much the same way with the same abuses, or replace them, but then the situation only worsens, since revolutionary transformations usually lead to a deterioration of the economic situation.

Secondly, since there was no rapid miracle and general improvement either after the January 25 revolution or after the June 30 events of 2013, which some researchers call a "counter-revolution", and since revolutionary actions and mass distribution of promises lead to a deterioration of the situation in the country, it is extremely necessary to find the culprit in order to "translate the arrows" of popular discontent. And here we are faced with a rather delicate situation: will revolutionaries calmly wait a few years to win the next election? Of course not, the revolutionary era is not a time when people live in peace. Everyone needs something quickly, immediately, and uncompromisingly complete, as the masses ask uncomfortable questions. In this case, the democratically elected leadership, led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is caught between a rock and a hard place (i.e., between radicals who are unhappy that the situation is getting worse and conservatives who are unhappy with change and disorder).

Third, the masses, for whom the main thing is to solve the following problems:-

The research was carried out within the framework of the HSE Basic Research Program in 2016 with the support of the Russian Science Foundation project "Russian Policy in the Middle East: Prospects and Limits of Cooperation with the countries of the region" (N 14-18-03615).

They are beginning to become disillusioned with the ruling regime because of their specific and immediate material problems. In general, more and more people are no longer connecting the solution of acute social problems with the abstract idea of democracy, but they are connecting them specifically with the need to fight the notorious "forces of evil" - enemies of the revolution, the president, former functionaries, oligarchs, etc. - and this is much clearer and more concrete for them. Thus, all conditions are created for radicalization and deepening of the revolution.

Here it would be appropriate to recall Raymond Aron (1905-1983, French philosopher, political scientist, sociologist and publicist)³, who noted the need to limit the demands of the masses even at the initial stage of the development of the constitutional regime as an important condition for the stability of the liberal regime. However, it is clear that the revolutionary masses do not support revolutions in order to moderate their demands and wait. They feel like they've waited too long already. However, since it is impossible to fulfill hasty and excessive demands, there is a risk of sliding into an economic catastrophe, followed by the overthrow of the regime.

Fourth, as the post-revolutionary events in Egypt have shown, supporters of democracy as a political system in which they accept defeat and work calmly in opposition have an extremely narrow social base in the current conditions. After three years of political turbulence, accompanied by a difficult socio-economic situation, the majority of Egyptians ' principles receded into the background. When Egyptians voted for Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2014, they did not just choose another president who emerged from the military environment: they preferred the "stability" that they were willing to sacrifice when they overthrew Hosni Mubarak in 2011 to democratic changes. In the person of al-Sisi, the people would like to see a new Nasser, a man who can bring order with a "hard hand", a strong leader who has concentrated all power in his hands. ⁴ And he got it.

Here are examples of how the reconstruction of the Egyptian political space is increasingly revealing that Egyptian society has reached the zero point from which the upheaval actually began: the harsh suppression of demonstrations in support of freedom of speech that repeatedly took place in 2016 near the syndicate of journalists, as well as protests against the sale of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia. In the Red Sea; accusations against the Egyptian prison services regarding the increased use of torture and violence in places of detention (the murder of socialist activist Shaima al-Sabah in January 2015, the use of torture against 65-year-old shop owner Hussein Fergali in May 2016).⁵. The new Egyptian government is becoming increasingly militarized and less democratic ⁶.

Finally, democratic institutions in their pure form are not suitable for revolution. Radical revolutionary transformations are often carried out through constituent or constitutional assemblies, parliaments, and so on. But this is good at the beginning, for the most urgent or consensual changes. "A revolution is a breakdown, often radical, abrupt and violent. And it's always a quick withdrawal"⁷. Ordinary parliamentary procedures with lengthy discussions, delays, and respect for the rights of the minority do not suit anyone here. Therefore, laws or decrees aimed at radical changes can be passed through the assembly, parliament, council, Mejlis, but at the head there must always be a certain body of dictatorship (party, Central Committee, executive committee, leader, president, special council, etc.), which relies mainly on a revolutionary source of power, and therefore it is not controlled by the parliament. It is there that the main issues are resolved, which are then submitted for approval. At the same time, democratic or pseudo-democratic statements of fateful and groundbreaking documents or decisions are very often used to consolidate power in the hands of the winning party.

Egypt is increasingly confronted with the fact that the pure and full-scale democracy that the revolution sought to consolidate, in fact, quite soon began to contradict both the true goals of the revolution and other political (group, personal, etc.) goals and conditions. And, if the democratically elected government in the person of Mohammed Morsi was ultimately overthrown, then Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, chosen in the same way, decided not to repeat the mistakes of his predecessor, which predetermined a tilt towards authoritarianism.

It is not surprising that, having found himself in such a situation, al-Sisi is forced to resort to constructing an image of the enemy ("forces of evil" in his interpretation), creating an opposition based on the principle of" friends " and "strangers": not in the sense of "strangers" that they are unpleasant, but in the sense of unpleasant that they are "strangers". In the mid-twentieth century, the German philosopher Karl Schmitt noted that " the political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that of friend and foe."⁸. The meaning of this is to indicate the highest degree of intensity of connection or separation, association and dissociation; to create prerequisites for the consolidation of Egyptian society, able to distinguish between friend and enemy.

In this regard, the Egyptian leadership has no other way to preserve itself as a political entity, other than creating and maintaining the image of the" forces of evil", as well as constantly reproducing the energy of hostility. It is noteworthy that K. Schmitt, when discussing the image of the enemy in a political context, noted the repetition of behavioral patterns associated with the predator-prey relationship in wildlife.⁹ This, in turn, makes it possible to achieve the main goal.

the ideological goal of the regime is to exclude independent, uncontrolled participation in power of certain groups, including those who were involved in political life in the previous democratic period.

FOLLOWING IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF ISMAIL PASHA

In 1858, members of the Egyptian ruling house, including Said Pasha's successor, Ahmad, were invited to the grand opening ceremony of a new railway line. However, due to some oversight, the train was allowed to pass over the unfinished bridge over the Nile. As a result, almost all the famous passengers were killed, and five years later the new ruler of Egypt was Said Pasha's nephew and son of Ibrahim Pasha-Ismail.

The reforms carried out by Ismail were comparable in scale to the reforms of the 1830s under Muhammad Ali*^10,11. "Authoritarianism, the pro-Western nature of the worldview and the tendency to reform - these are the three features that characterized the period of Ismail Pasha's rule," writes the Russian orientalist E. I. Zelenev12.

Acting in the spirit of Muhammad Ali's reform initiatives, Ismail Pasha was a supporter of the implementation of major infrastructure and social projects. Under his leadership, the number of primary schools increased more than 20 times, the number of secondary and special educational institutions increased, and such world-famous institutions as the National Museum, the National Library, the Cairo Opera, and the first scientific and educational societies were established.¹³

The construction of bridges and lighthouses, the expansion and deepening of sea and river harbors-all this characterized the period of Ismail Pasha's rule. Under him, the country was provided with an infrastructure of highways and railways, "in terms of the saturation of which per person, Egypt ranked among the first in the world, which, in turn, accelerated the transportation of export cargo - the main source of the country's well-being"¹⁴.

Ismail Pasha was entrusted with the mission of opening the Suez Canal, which is still one of the country's key sources of income. In parallel with the construction of the canal, significant irrigation works were carried out, which expanded the areas of irrigation farming, which made it possible to harvest two or even three crops per year15.

The flip side of Ismail Pasha's reforms, undoubtedly aimed at turning Egypt into a modern, modernized state, was their high cost, which was covered by external loans. Foreign investors attracted by Ismail Pasha profited from Egyptian economic projects. Egyptian loans brought huge profits to European creditors, for which Egypt was unofficially nicknamed the "Klondike on the Nile". Thus, with the average interest rate on loans in Europe at that time of 3.5-5%, Egypt received loans at 12-26%, or even at 30% ^.16 As a result, if before the middle of the XIX century. Egypt had virtually no government debt, but by the early 1880s its debt, mainly to Anglo-French banks, was estimated to be between 94 and ⁹⁸ million francs17, which the Russian arabist Gurko-Kryazhin later rightly called "a classic example of financial conquest" ¹⁸.

However, the lack of funds to pay off creditors can hardly be attributed solely to Ismail Pasha. At that time, one of the main sources of income of the Egyptian budget was the export of cotton, the sale of which on the international market brought significant profits due to increased demand for it during the American Civil War (1861-1865), which occurred at the beginning of the reign of Ismail Pasha. But the calculation that the funds received from the sale of cotton would allow paying off European creditors not only failed, but also caused losses. The reason for this was the end of the American Civil War and the subsequent drop in demand for cotton. In addition, "the epidemic destroyed almost all cattle in Egypt, and new animals had to be purchased abroad, which also required significant budgetary resources." ¹⁹

The steps taken by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to boost the Egyptian economy through the implementation of major infrastructure projects are rather deja vu in relation to the reforms of Ismail Pasha. In the past two years, the government has already launched 8 mega-projects: the expansion of the Suez Canal, the development of 1.5 million feddans of desert land, which should increase the area of agricultural land by 20%; the construction of thousands of low-cost housing units; the modernization of existing power plants and the construction of new ones, including the Dabaa nuclear power plant, which should be Rosatom, as well as improving the country's infrastructure (active work is underway to modernize the road network) and the service sector. As el-Sisi noted in an interview, "all these mega-projects aim to raise the living standards of Egyptians, as well as restore their self-sufficiency and help them gain faith in a better future." ²⁰

* Muhammad Ali - Egyptian pasha (1805-1848), who, according to the apt definition of G. Dodvel, is usually called "the founder of modern Egypt". During his reign, Egypt took a step away from the traditional society towards the modern one; a new economic system and a new structure of state bodies emerged, which led to the creation of a modern statehood in the country (author's note).

Chart 1. Dynamics of changes in monthly growth rates of manufacturing production ( % , in terms of the year, April-December 2014).

Note: For example, the number 23.56 above the "Oct. 2014" column indicates that production in October 2014 was 23.56% higher than in October 2013.

Source: Tradingeconomics Database.

FOR "OTHER PEOPLE'S" MONEY

The problem, however, is that the implementation of the planned megaprojects is actually carried out for "other people's" money. Recently, the al-Sisi administration has been noticeably successful in finding creditors, due to which the emerging growth of the Egyptian economy has become possible. The calculation, most likely, was made on the fact that oil prices will remain at the same level (and therefore, on the fact that the financial support of the regime from its main donors from the Gulf will remain at the same level), which has already failed to justify itself.

However, given the long-term nature of the return on mega-projects being implemented and their high cost, the risk of non-payment on loans will continue to dominate the country's leadership for a long time. According to government estimates, Egypt plans to spend 1.3 trillion Egyptian pounds on all planned projects, half of which will be spent on civil engineering and construction.²¹

One of the most expensive projects implemented by the Egyptian leadership is the expansion of the Suez Canal, which cost $4 billion and is the first stage of a mega-project to create a logistics and industrial hub along the canal. It also includes the construction of six tunnels under the Suez Canal at a cost of $8.2 billion, ²² which will link the Sinai Peninsula with the provinces of Port Said and Ismailia.

Another expected project is the construction of a new administrative capital, which will be located on a plot of 700 square meters. km east of Cairo. It is expected that the new city will be built within 5-7 years and will cost the budget $45 billion ²³.

Among the most global projects, we should also mention the so - called "Golden Triangle" - the creation of industrial and mining enterprises in an area of 6000 square kilometers-from the Red Sea near the cities of Safaga and Qusayr to the eastern Qena in Upper Egypt.

Housing construction projects are in the active phase. On May 18, 2016, the government-initiated Public Housing Fund signed an agreement with a coalition of Egyptian banks to provide financing in the amount of 20 billion Egyptian pounds.²⁴

Thus, by mid-2016, the National Bank of Egypt had already financed the purchase of more than 8,600 housing units for middle-and low-income citizens under the program of the Egyptian Central Bank. Their availability is due to a combination of three factors: low prices, long mortgage repayments (up to 20 years), and low interest rates (5-7% for low-income families and 8% for middle-income families, with the national average rate of 10.5%)²⁵.

An attempt to apply the "Ismail Pasha plan" (to disperse the Egyptian economy through megaprojects financed from abroad, and then pay off debts at the expense of income generated by economic growth) initially gave good results. 2014 was particularly successful for the Sisi administration.

In the third quarter of 2016, the Cabinet of Ibrahim Makhlab managed to achieve a GDP growth rate of 6.8% in annual terms (which would have been a good result for the prosperous Mubarak times)²⁶. The significant acceleration in Egypt's economic growth achieved by the Sisi-Mahlyab administration in 2014 has allowed it to reach a significant level of economic growth.-

There is also a noticeable drop in unemployment, which had been growing almost continuously since the January 25 revolution.²⁷

The Sisi-Mahlyab administration made particularly impressive gains in 2014 in the manufacturing sector, where the monthly growth rate (on an annual basis) was in the double digits in May and November, with a total growth rate of significantly more than 20%, a result that even China could envy (see figure 1)..

Up until the last quarter of 2014, the main Egyptian stock exchange index, EGX 30, also showed steady positive dynamics (see Figure 2). As we have shown earlier, ²⁸ the rally on the Egyptian stock exchange began a few days before the "counter-revolution" of June 30, 2013, when the Egyptian economic elite (which by then was in the middle of the crisis) was still in a state of in a close alliance with the military elite) learned about the military's planned takeover of power and the multibillion-dollar package of financial assistance agreed with the authorities of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait aimed at supporting the new authorities.

Chart 2. Dynamics of the main Egyptian stock exchange index EGX 30 (July 2013-October 2014).

Source: Tradingeconomics Database.

THREATS TO STABILITY

In one of our previous articles, ²⁹ we have already discussed the economic success achieved by the al-Sisi - Makhlab administration in 2014, but we came to the following conclusion: "However, the prospects for the al-Sisi - Makhlab administration are not so bright. At the same time, the main threat to its stability on the financial and economic front is the same factor that is the main threat to the stability of the Russian Federation. We are talking about a global drop in oil prices. The fact is that the al-Sisi administration is highly dependent on the financial support of the Persian Gulf oil monarchies - and, above all, Saudi Arabia. However, in the face of a global drop in oil prices, these monarchies themselves face serious financial problems, which makes them question reducing the financial support that is so important for al-Sisi. " ³⁰

Now we have to note that our forecast, unfortunately, was justified, and events went exactly according to the scenario we outlined. The reduction of financial support from the Gulf led to a rapid reduction in Egypt's gold and foreign exchange reserves in 2015 - in just 5 months (from April to September), they decreased by 20% ³¹.

This put a lot of pressure on the Egyptian pound. However, unlike the Russian leadership, the Egyptian administration could not afford the luxury of letting its national currency float freely. Egypt is too dependent on food imports, and bringing the Egyptian pound in line with the supply and demand of the Egyptian foreign exchange market would lead to a sharp increase in food prices, which the Egyptian leadership had reason to fear in the most serious way.

The Egyptian administration kept the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound at 7.6 per $¹ until July 2015, and only in July devalued the pound quite a bit-to the level of 7.8 per $1.32. As a result, it was almost impossible to purchase any large amount of foreign currency at the official exchange rate and through official channels. And most of the Egyptian industrial enterprises are very dependent on imported raw materials and raw materials-

the missing ones. As a result, the growth rate of Egyptian GDP began to slow down, and a real decline began in the Egyptian manufacturing industry (see figure 3). Only at the very beginning of November 2016, the Egyptian government stopped curbing the exchange rate of the national currency, letting it float freely, which instantly led to its depreciation twice (17.6 per $1). as of November 22, 2016).

Chart 3. Dynamics of changes in monthly growth rates of manufacturing production ( % , in terms of the year, February-September 2015).

Source: Tradingeconomics Database.

The aggravation of economic problems forced al-Sisi to change the prime Minister: in September 2015, I. Makhlab was replaced by Sherif Ismail, but this, of course, did not lead to an immediate improvement in the economic situation. Therefore, by October 31, 2015, when a Russian plane with tourists on board was killed in a terrorist attack, the Egyptian economy was already in a serious state. The subsequent cessation of tourist flows from Russia and the United Kingdom (which were the top two countries in terms of the number of tourists coming from there) dealt another powerful blow to the Egyptian economy. It is not surprising that for almost the entire year 2015 and up to March 2016, the main Egyptian stock exchange index EGX 30 was in a state of continuous decline (see figure 4).

Chart 4. Dynamics of the main Egyptian stock exchange index EGX 30 (April 2015-January 2016).

Source: Tradingeconomics Database.

However, al-Sisi once again proved to be a grandmaster of both political and economic maneuvering. First of all, he has shown himself to be an excellent master of establishing good relations with all influential players - with the United States, Russia, the Gulf states, China, Western Europe, and Japan... And practically

Wherever possible, he was able to negotiate the receipt - in the form of various kinds of concessional loans, and direct assistance-of much-needed foreign currency funds for Egypt. And in November 2016, the Egyptian government managed to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund on a $12 billion loan, which could correct external imbalances and help restore competitiveness in the country, as well as lead to a reduction in public debt and a reduction in the budget deficit.³³

As a result, in the spring of 2016, the al-Sisi-Ismail administration managed to overcome the currency crisis more or less34. Manufacturing output growth rates reached a positive zone35, and the Egyptian stock exchange index ^EGX 30 resumed its growth36.

But it was achieved at a high price. The fact is that the main financial assistance this time was received from Saudi Arabia. And in exchange for this help, al-Sisi had to make certain concessions in a territorial dispute with the Kingdom over the uninhabited but strategically located Red Sea islands of Tirana and Sanafir. The opposition interpreted this as a "sale of Egyptian land" and used it to organize large-scale protests on April 15, 2016. At the same time, a particularly dangerous symptom for al-Sisi was that on April 15, for the first time in a very long time, the liberal-secular and Islamist opposition came together, and it was this somewhat unnatural bloc that cost Hosni Mubarak the presidency in January-February 2011. These authorities quickly suppressed the protests both by force and by force. through statements that the issue of transferring the islands has not yet been resolved definitively. But they have shown that the resilience of the al-Sisi regime cannot be overestimated either.

* * *

It is fundamentally impossible to predict whether al-Sisi will be able to do what Ismail Pasha failed to do at the time. In our opinion, the Sisi administration's program of action is extremely risky, but it is well thought out, and it still has some chances of ultimate success. But this success depends on too many factors beyond al-Sisi's control (for example, the same global prices for hydrocarbons).

The massive investments made by the Sisi administration in Egypt's infrastructure will serve the country well in any case, just as the thousands of kilometers of railways, highways, telegraph lines, irrigation canals, and many bridges across the Nile built by Ismail Pasha with borrowed money were very useful to Egypt. Despite the fact that the Khedive himself, unable to pay off his debts, had to go into exile...

^{Ezzidin T.} 1 After two eears as President, What did Al-Sisi choose to reveal? // Daily News Egypt, 05.06.2016. P. 3.

² Ibidem.

^{Aron R.} 3 Demokratiya i totalitarizm [Democracy and totalitarianism]. Moscow, Text, 1993.

^{Doroshenko E. And} 4. Egypt: historical images and allusions of the presidential campaign of 2014 / / Asia and Africa Today. 2016. N 8. (Doroshenko E.I. 2016. Egypt: Historical images and allusions of the 2014 presidential campaign // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 8) (in Russian)

^{Ezzidin T.} 5 Op. cit.

^{Isaev L. M.} 6 Generaly ukhli, generaly vozvrashchali: egyp'tskoi revolyutsii tri goda [Generals left, Generals returned: three years of the Egyptian Revolution]. Neprikosnovennyi zapas, 2014, No. 1, p. 131. (Issaev L. M. 2014. Generaly ushli, generaly vernulis... // Neprikosnovennyi zapas. N 1) (in Russian)

^{Grinin L. E.} 7, Isaev L. M., Korotaev A.V. Revolutions and instability in the Middle East. Moscow, Uchitel, 2015. p. 72. (Grinin L. E., Issaev L. M., Korotaev A.V. 2015. Revolutions and Instability in the Middle East. M.) (in Russian)

^{8. Schmitt K.} 8 Ponyatie politicheskogo [The concept of Politics]. Voprosy sotsiologii, 1992, No. 1, p. 40 (Shmitt C. 1992. The Concept of the Political // Voprosy sotsiologii. N 1) (in Russian)

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ См.: Tignor L. Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914. Princeton, 1966.

^{Dodwell H.} 11 The Founder of Modern Egypt. Cambridge, 1931.

Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie, sudebnaya sistema i armiya v Egipte i Syrie (XVI - nachalo XX veka) [State administration, judicial system and Army in Egypt and Syria (XVI-early XX centuries)]. SPbU Publishing House, 2003. (Zelenev E. I. 2003. The Public Administration, judisial system, and Army in Egypt and Syria (XVI - ХХ century. SPb.) (in Russian)

¹³ См.: Tignor L. Op. cit.; Heyworth-Dunne J. An Introduction to the History of Education in Egypt. London, 1938.

^{Marsot A.} 14 Short History of Modern Egypt. Cambridge, 1994. P. 68.

¹⁵ See: Zelenev E. I. Edict op.

Diplomatic history of the Egyptian crisis of 1881-1882 (in the light of Russian archival materials), Moscow, 1979, p. 25.

^{Koshelev V. S.} 17 Egypt: lessons of History. The Struggle against colonial rule and Counterrevolution (1879-1881). Moscow, 1984. p. 12.

^{Kryazhin V. A.} 18 National liberation movements in the Middle East. Part 1. Syria and Palestine. Cilicia, Mesopotamia and Egypt, Moscow, 1923, p. 116.

^{Zelenev E. I.} 19 Decree. Op. p. 176.

^{Sadek A.} 20 Sisi Pledges to Build a Modern Egypt Despite Challenges President: Nation's Future Depends on Youth // The Egyptian Gazette, 04.06.2016. P. 1.

²¹ Al-Sisi's mega projects: a road to growth or to inflation? // Daily News Egypt, 08.06.2016 - http://www.daily-newsegypt.com/2016/06/08/al-sisis-mega-projects-a-road-to-growth-or-to-inflation/

²² Ibidem.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Egypt's Banking Sector Inks Biggest Ever Loan in Favor of Social Housing Fund // Daily News Egypt, 02.06.2016. P. 6.

²⁵ NBE Finances Purchase of 8600 Low- and Middle-Income Housing with EGP 700m // Daily News Egypt, 02.06.2016. P. 3.

²⁶ Tradingeconomics Database - http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/gdp-growth

²⁷ Tradingeconomics Database - http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/unemployment-rate

^{Isaev L. M.} 28, Korotaev A.V. The Egyptian coup of 2013: the experience of econometric analysis / / Asia and Af-

rika segodnya, 2014. N 2. pp. 14-20 (Issaev L. M., Korotaev A.V. 2014. Egyptian coup d'etat 2013: an econometric analysis / / Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 2) (in Russian)

^{Korotaev A.V.} 29, Isaev L. M. Politicheskaya geografiya sovremennogo Egypti [Political Geography of modern Egypt]. Politicheskie issledovaniya, 2015. N 2. pp. 117-136 (Korotaev A.V., Issaev L. M. 2015. Political Geography of the Modern Egypt / / Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya. N 2) (in Russian)

³⁰ Ibid., p. 132.

³¹ Tradingeconomics Database - http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/foreign-exchange-reserves

³² Tradingeconomics Database - http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/currency

^{Hadid D.} 33 Painful Steps Help Egypt Secure $12 Billion I.M.F. Loan // The New York Times, 11.11.2016 - www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/world/middleeast/egypt-gets-final-imf-approval-for-12-billion-loan.html?_r=0

³⁴ This, however, was also facilitated by the significant devaluation of the Egyptian pound in March 2016 (from 7.8 to more than 8.8 pounds per US dollar).

³⁵ Tradingeconomics Database - http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/manufacturing-production

³⁶ Tradingeconomics Database - http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/stock-market

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